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### T USFG---1NC

#### The resolution should define the division of ground. It was negotiated and announced in advance providing both teams a reasonable opportunity to prepare. Only a textual reading of the resolution provides a predictable basis for research.

#### USFG means the three branches.

OECD 87. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The Control and Management of Government Expenditure. 179. Google Book.

1. Political and organizational structure of government The United States America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of government are complex and varied (see Section B for more information). The Federal Government is composed of three branches: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as follows.

#### ‘Resolved’ means to enact a policy by law.

Words and Phrases 64. Permanent Edition. Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### Should is mandatory.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department D. 02. IN RE: the Marriage of Vanessa A. McNUTT, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Shane M. McNUTT, Respondent-Appellant. No. 1 CA-CV 01-0255. Decided: June 27, 2002 https://caselaw.findlaw.com/az-court-of-appeals/1315322.html

¶ 26 The word “should” is most commonly used to express obligation or duty.   See The American Heritage Dictionary 1670 (3d ed.1992).   We conclude that, based on the intent of the Guidelines and the interest of parents in the allocation of the federal tax exemption, the word “should” as used in § 25 of the Guidelines is mandatory rather than discretionary.   See Lincoln v. Lincoln, 155 Ariz. 272, 276, 746 P.2d 13, 17 (App.1987) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allocate the dependency exemption).   Thus, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to allocate the federal tax exemption, and we direct the trial court to allocate the exemption on remand.

#### ‘Antitrust laws’ are statutes.

Grimes ’20 [Charles W; 2020; editor of this Licensing Update and Law Professor at Ava Maria Law School; Wolters Kluwer, “Licensing Update,” https://www.crowell.com/files/20200401-Licensing-Update-Chapter-13.pdf]

§13.02 ANTITRUST LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### Their ‘scope’ is defined by government.

Sagers ’15 [Christopher L; 2015; the James A. Thomas Distinguished Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Cleveland-Marshall Solo Practice Incubator; Handbook on the Scope of Antitrust, “Introduction,” Ch. 1, p. 9]

B. Sources of the Scope of Antitrust Law

The scope of federal antitrust law is governed by three separate authorities: (1) the U.S. Constitution, (2) the language of the antitrust statutes themselves, and (3) the language of other federal statutes and regulations.

#### Vote negative:

#### 1. Clash: debate requires a predictable topic to motivate in depth research that yields the values of negation and argument refinement. Their interp explodes limits, allows affirmative conditionality, and makes debate a one-sided monologue devoid of argumentation which turns the case.

#### 2. Fairness: the neg should win on average 50% of the time. Entering a competitive activity proves their arguments are shaped by a drive to win. The insurmountable advantage of being affirmative under their unfair model is a reason they should lose.

### Cap K---1NC

#### Capitalism transforms individuals into ‘Nobodys’ that creates the conditions for state violence. Our critique does not deny the importance of identity, rather only an understanding of class as the mediating condition of oppression can make movements effective.

Marc L. Hill 16. Distinguished Professor of African American Studies at Morehouse College. *Nobody, Casualties of America’s War on the Vulnerable, from Ferguson to Flint and Beyond*. Atria Books. 17-20.

To be Nobody is to be abandoned by the State. For decades now, we have witnessed a radical transformation in the role and function of government in America. An obsession with free-market logic and culture has led the political class to craft policies that promote private interests over the public good. As a result, our schools, our criminal justice system, our military, our police departments, our public policy, and virtually every other entity engineered to protect life and enhance prosperity have been at least partially relocated to the private sector. At the same time, the private sector has kept its natural commitment to maximizing profits rather than investing in people. This arrangement has left the nation’s vulnerable wedged between the Scylla of negligent government and the Charybdis of corporate greed, trapped in a historically unprecedented state of precarity.

To be Nobody is to be considered disposable. In New Orleans, we saw the natural disaster of Hurricane Katrina followed by a grossly unnatural government response, one that killed thousands of vulnerable citizens and consigned many more to refugee status. In Flint, Michigan, we are witnessing this young century’s most profound illustration of civic evil, an entire city collectively punished with lead-poisoned water for the crime of being poor, Black, and politically disempowered. Every day, the nation’s homeless, mentally ill, drug addicted, and poor are pushed out of institutions of support and relocated to jails and prisons. These conditions reflect a prevailing belief that the vulnerable are unworthy of investment, protection, or even the most fundamental provisions of the social contract. As a result, they can be erased, abandoned, and even left to die.

Without question, Nobodyness is largely indebted to race, as White supremacy is foundational to the American democratic experiment. The belief that White lives are worth more than others – what Princeton University scholar Eddie Glaude calls the “value gap” – continues to color every aspect of our public and private lives.1 This belief likewise compromises the lives of vulnerable White citizens, many of who support political movements and policies that close ranks around Whiteness rather than ones that enhance their own social and economic interests.

While Nobodyness is strongly tethered to race, it cannot be divorced from other forms of social injustice. Instead, it must be understood through the lens of “intersectionality,” the ways that multiple forms of oppression operate simultaneously against the vulnerable.2 It would be impossible to example the 2014 killing of Mya Hall by National Security Agency police without understanding how sexism and transphobia conspire with structural racism to endanger Black trans bodies. We cannot make sense of Sandra Bland’s tragic death without recognizing the impact of gender and poverty in shaping the current carceral state. To understand the complexity of oppression, we must avoid simple solutions and singular answers.

Despite the centrality of race within American life, Nobodyness cannot be understood without an equally thorough analysis of class. Unlike other forms of difference, class creates the material conditions and relations through which racism, sexism, and other forms of oppression are produced, sustained, and lived. This does not mean that all forms of injustice are due to class antagonism, nor does it mean that all forms of domination can be automatically fixed through universal class struggle. Rather, it means that we cannot begin to address the various forms of oppression experienced by America’s vulnerable without radically changing a system that defends class at all costs.

This book is my attempt to tell these stories of those marked as Nobody. Based on extensive research, as well as my time on the ground – in Ferguson, Baltimore, New York City, Atlanta, Hempstead, Flint, and Sanford – I want to show how the high-profile and controversial cases of State violence that we’ve witnessed over the past few years are but a symptom of a deeper American problem. Underneath each case is a more fundamental set of economic conditions, political arrangements, and power relations that transforms everyday citizens into casualties of an increasingly intense war on the vulnerable. It is my hope that this book offers an analysis that spotlights the humanity of these “Nobodies” and inspires principled action.

#### The world is too complex for local politics---multipolar global politics, economic instability, and climate change necessitates a collective response that changes the structural conditions of power rather than tinkering around at the margins.

Nick SRNICEK AND Alex WILLIAMS 15. \*\*Lecturer at City University London and a PhD from the London School of Economics. \*\*Lecturer at City University London. *Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work*. Verso Books. 34-40.

OVERWHELMED

Why did folk politics arise in the first place? Why is it that folk political tendencies, for all their manifest flaws, are so seductive and appealing to the movements of today? At least three answers present themselves. The first explanation is to see folk politics as a response to the problem of how to interpret and act within an ever more complex world. The second, related explanation involves situating folk politics as a reaction to the historical experiences of the communist and social democratic left. Finally, folk politics is a more immediate response to the empty spectacle of contemporary party politics.

Increasingly, multipolar global politics, economic instability, and anthropogenic climate change outpace the narratives we use to structure and make sense of our lives. Each of these is an example of what is termed a complex system, which features nonlinear dynamics, where marginally different inputs can cause dramatically divergent outputs, intricate sets of causes feedback on one another in unexpected ways, and which characteristically operates on scales of space and time that go far beyond any individual’s unaided perception.23 Globalisation, international politics, and climate change: each of these systems shapes our world, but their effects are so extensive and complicated that it is difficult to place our own experience within them. The global economy is a good example of this. In simple terms, the economy is not an object amenable to direct perception; it is distributed across time and space (you will never meet ‘the economy’ in person); it incorporates a wide array of elements, from property laws to biological needs, natural resources to technological infrastructures, market stalls and supercomputers; and it involves an enormous and intricately interacting set of feedback loops, all of which produce emergent effects that are irreducible to its individual components.24 In other words, the interaction of an economy’s parts produces effects that cannot be understood just by knowing how those parts work in isolation – it is only in grasping the relations between them that the economy can be made sense of. While we might have an idea of what an economy consists of, we will never be able to experience it directly in the same way as other phenomena. It can only be observed symptomatically through key statistical indexes (charting changes in inflation or interest rates, stock indexes, GDP, and so on), but can never be seen, heard or touched in its totality.

As a result, despite everything that has been written about capitalism, we still struggle to understand its dynamics and its mechanisms. Most importantly, we lack a ‘cognitive map’ of our socioeconomic system: a mental picture of how individual and collective human action can be situated within the unimaginable vastness of the global economy.25 Recent decades have seen an increasing complexity in the dynamics that impinge upon politics. We might consider the imminent threat of anthropogenic climate change as a new kind of problem – one that is unamenable to any simple solution and that involves such intricately woven effects that it is hard to even know where to intervene. Equally, the global economy today appears significantly more complex in terms of the mobility of capital, the intricacies of global finance and the multiplicity of actors involved. How well do our traditional political images of the world map onto these changes? For the left at least, an analysis premised on the industrial working class was a powerful way to interpret the totality of social and economic relations in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, thereby articulating clear strategic objectives. Yet the history of the global left over the course of the twentieth century attests to the ways in which this analysis failed to attend to both the range of possible liberating struggles (based in gender, race or sexuality) and the ability of capitalism to restructure itself – through the creation of the welfare state, or the neoliberal transformations of the global economy. Today, the old models often falter in the face of new problems; we lose the capacity to understand our position in history and in the world at large.

This separation between everyday experience and the system we live within results in increased alienation: we feel adrift in a world we do not understand. The cultural theorist Fredric Jameson notes that the proliferation of conspiracy theories is partly a response to this situation.26 Conspiracy theories act by narrowing the agency behind our world to a single figure of power (the Bilderberg Group, the Freemasons or some other convenient scapegoat). Despite the extraordinary complexity of some of these theories, they nevertheless provide a reassuringly simple answer to ‘who is behind it all’, and what our own role is in the situation. In other words, they act precisely as a (faulty) cognitive map.

Folk politics presents itself as another possible response to the problems of overwhelming complexity. If we do not understand how the world operates, the folk-political injunction is to reduce complexity down to a human scale. Indeed, folk-political writing is saturated with calls for a return to authenticity, to immediacy, to a world that is ‘transparent’, ‘human-scaled’, ‘tangible’, ‘slow’, ‘harmonious’, ‘simple’, and ‘everyday’.27 Such thinking rejects the complexity of the contemporary world, and thereby rejects the possibility of a truly postcapitalist world. It attempts to give a human face to power; whereas what is truly terrifying is the generally asubjective nature of the system. The faces are interchangeable; the power remains the same. The turn towards localism, temporary moments of resistance, and the intuitive practices of direct action all effectively attempt to condense the problems of global capitalism into concrete figures and moments.

In this process, folk politics often reduces politics to an ethical and individual struggle. There is a tendency sometimes to imagine that we simply need ‘good’ capitalists, or a ‘responsible’ capitalism. At the same time, the imperative to ‘make it local’ leads folk politics to fetishise immediate results and the concrete appearance of action. Delaying a corporate attack on the environment, for instance, is lauded as a success – even if the company simply waits out public attention before returning once again. Moreover, as Rosa Luxemburg pointed out long ago, the fetishisation of ‘immediate results’ leads to an empty pragmatism that struggles to maintain the present balance of power, rather than seeking to change structural conditions.28 Without the necessary abstraction of strategic thought, tactics are ultimately fleeting gestures. Finally, the abjuring of complexity dovetails with the neoliberal case for markets. One of the primary arguments made against planning has been that the economy is simply too complex to be guided.29 The only alternative is therefore to leave the distribution of resources to the market and reject any attempt to guide it rationally.30 Considered in all these ways, folk politics appears as an attempt to make global capitalism small enough to be thinkable – and at the same time, to articulate how to act upon this restricted image of capitalism. By contrast, the argument of this book is that folk-political tendencies are mistaken. If complexity presently outstrips humanity’s capacities to think and control, there are two options: one is to reduce complexity down to a human scale; the other is to expand humanity’s capacities. We endorse the latter position. Any postcapitalist project will necessarily require the creation of new cognitive maps, political narratives, technological interfaces, economic models, and mechanisms of collective control to be able to marshal complex phenomena for the betterment of humanity.

#### The impact is mass death and global violence.

Adrian Parr 13. Associate Professor of Philosophy and Environmental Studies at the University of Cincinnati. *The Wrath of Capital: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics*. Columbia University Press. 145-7.

A quick snapshot of the twenty-first century so far: an economic meltdown; a frantic sell-off of public land to the energy business as President George W Bush exited the White House; a prolonged, costly, and unjustified war in Iraq; the Greek economy in ruins; an escalation of global food prices; bee colonies in global extinction; 925 million hungry reported in 2010; as of 2005, the world's five hundred richest individuals with a combined income greater than that of the poorest 416 million people, the richest 10 percent accounting for 54 percent of global income; a planet on the verge of boiling point; melting ice caps; increases in extreme weather conditions; and the list goes on and on and on.2 Sounds like a ticking time bomb, doesn't it? Well it is.

It is shameful to think that massive die-outs of future generations will put to pale comparison the 6 million murdered during the Holocaust; the millions killed in two world wars; the genocides in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur; the 1 million left homeless and the 316,000 killed by the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The time has come to wake up to the warning signs.3

The real issue climate change poses is that we do not enjoy the luxury of incremental change anymore. We are in the last decade where we can do something about the situation. Paul Gilding, the former head of Greenpeace International and a core faculty member of Cambridge University's Programme for Sustainability, explains that "two degrees of warming is an inadequate goal and a plan for failure;' adding that "returning to below one degree of warming . . . is the solution to the problem:'4 Once we move higher than 2°C of warming, which is what is projected to occur by 2050, positive feedback mechanisms will begin to kick in, and then we will be at the point of no return. We therefore need to start thinking very differently right now.

We do not see the crisis for what it is; we only see it as an isolated symptom that we need to make a few minor changes to deal with. This was the message that Venezuela's president Hugo Chavez delivered at the COP15 United Nations Climate Summit in Copenhagen on December 16 09, when he declared: "Let's talk about the cause. We should not avoid responsibilities, we should not avoid the depth of this problem. And I'll bring it up again, the cause of this disastrous panorama is the metabolic, destructive system of the capital and its model: capitalism.”5

#### The alt is pragmatic demands upon the state towards an anti-capitalist project. This is necessary to open space for more radical projects. Their strategy cedes the political.

David Harvey 15. Distinguished Professor of anthropology and geography at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. “Consolidating Power.” Roar Issue 0, 16. https://roarmag.org/magazine/david-harvey-consolidating-power/.

So, looking at examples from southern Europe – solidarity networks in Greece, self-organization in Spain or Turkey – these seem to be very crucial for building social movements around everyday life and basic needs these days. Do you see this as a promising approach?

I think it is very promising, but there is a clear self-limitation in it, which is a problem for me. The self-limitation is the reluctance to take power at some point. Bookchin, in his last book, says that the problem with the anarchists is their denial of the significance of power and their inability to take it. Bookchin doesn’t go this far, but I think it is the refusal to see the state as a possible partner to radical transformation.

There is a tendency to regard the state as being the enemy, the 100 percent enemy. And there are plenty of examples of repressive states out of public control where this is the case. No question: the capitalist state has to be fought, but without dominating state power and without taking it on you quickly get into the story of what happened for example in 1936 and 1937 in Barcelona and then all over Spain. By refusing to take the state at a moment where they had the power to do it, the revolutionaries in Spain allowed the state to fall back into the hands of the bourgeoisie and the Stalinist wing of the Communist movement – and the state got reorganized and smashed the resistance.

That might be true for the Spanish state in the 1930s, but if we look at the contemporary neoliberal state and the retreat of the welfare state, what is left of the state to be conquered, to be seized?

To begin with, the left is not very good at answering the question of how we build massive infrastructures. How will the left build the Brooklyn bridge, for example? Any society relies on big infrastructures, infrastructures for a whole city – like the water supply, electricity and so on. I think that there is a big reluctance among the left to recognize that therefore we need some different forms of organization.

There are wings of the state apparatus, even of the neoliberal state apparatus, which are therefore terribly important – the center of disease control, for example. How do we respond to global epidemics such as Ebola and the like? You can’t do it in the anarchist way of DIY [do it yourself]-organization. There are many instances where you need some state-like forms of infrastructure. We can’t confront the problem of global warming through decentralized forms of confrontations and activities alone.

One example that is often mentioned, despite its many problems, is the Montreal Protocol to phase out the use of chlorofluorocarbon in refrigerators to limit the depletion of the ozone layer. It was successfully enforced in the 1990s but it needed some kind of organization that is very different to the one coming out of assembly-based politics.

From an anarchist perspective, I would say that it is possible to replace even supra-national institutions like the WHO with confederal organizations which are built from the bottom up and which eventually arrive at worldwide decision-making.

Maybe to a certain degree, but we have to be aware that there will always be some kind of hierarchies and we will always face problems like accountability or the right of recourse. There will be complicated relationships between, for example, people dealing with the problem of global warming from the standpoint of the world as a whole and from the standpoint of a group that is on the ground, let’s say in Hanover or somewhere, and that wonders: ‘why should we listen to what they are saying?’

So you believe this would require some form of authority?

No, there will be authority structures anyway – there will always be. I have never been in an anarchist meeting where there was no secret authority structure. There is always this fantasy of everything being horizontal, but I sit there and watch and think: ‘oh god, there is a whole hierarchical structure in here – but it’s covert.’

Coming back to the recent protests around the Mediterranean: many movements have focused on local struggles. What is the next step to take towards social transformation?

At some point we have to create organizations which are able to assemble and enforce social change on a broader scale. For example, will Podemos in Spain be able to do that? In a chaotic situation like the economic crisis of the last years, it is important for the left to act. If the left doesn’t make it, then the right-wing is the next option. I think – and I hate to say this – but I think the left has to be more pragmatic in relation to the dynamics going on right now.

More pragmatic in what sense?

Well, why did I support SYRIZA even though it is not a revolutionary party? Because it opened a space in which something different could happen and therefore it was a progressive move for me.

It is a bit like Marx saying: the first step to freedom is the limitation of the length of the working day. Very narrow demands open up space for much more revolutionary outcomes, and even when there isn’t any possibility for any revolutionary outcomes, we have to look for compromise solutions which nevertheless roll back the neoliberal austerity nonsense and open the space where new forms of organizing can take place.

For example, it would be interesting if Podemos looked towards organizing forms of democratic confederalism – because in some ways Podemos originated with lots of assembly-type meetings taking place all over Spain, so they are very experienced with the assembly structure.

The question is how they connect the assembly-form to some permanent forms of organization concerning their upcoming position as a strong party in Parliament. This also goes back to the question of consolidating power: you have to find ways to do so, because without it the bourgeoisie and corporate capitalism are going to find ways to reassert it and take the power back.

What do you think about the dilemma of solidarity networks filling the void after the retreat of the welfare state and indirectly becoming a partner of neoliberalism in this way?

There are two ways of organizing. One is a vast growth of the NGO sector, but a lot of that is externally funded, not grassroots, and doesn’t tackle the question of the big donors who set the agenda – which won’t be a radical agenda. Here we touch upon the privatization of the welfare state.

This seems to me to be very different politically from grassroots organizations where people are on their own, saying: ‘OK, the state doesn’t take care of anything, so we are going to have to take care of it by ourselves.’ That seems to me to be leading to forms of grassroots organization with a very different political status.

But how to avoid filling that gap by helping, for example, unemployed people not to get squeezed out by neoliberal state?

Well there has to be an anti-capitalist agenda, so that when the group works with people everybody knows that it is not only about helping them to cope but that there is an organized intent to politically change the system in its entirety. This means having a very clear political project, which is problematic with decentralized, non-homogenous types of movements where somebody works one way, others work differently and there is no collective or common project.

This connects to the very first question you raised: there is no coordination of what the political objectives are. And the danger is that you just help people cope and there will be no politics coming out of it. For example, Occupy Sandy helped people get back to their houses and they did terrific work, but in the end they did what the Red Cross and federal emergency services should have done.

The end of history seems to have passed already. Looking at the actual conditions and concrete examples of anti-capitalist struggle, do you think “winning” is still an option?

Definitely, and moreover, you have occupied factories in Greece, solidarity economies across production chains being forged, radical democratic institutions in Spain and many beautiful things happening in many other places. There is a healthy growth of recognition that we need to be much broader concerning politics among all these initiatives.

The Marxist left tends to be a little bit dismissive of some of this stuff and I think they are wrong. But at the same time I don’t think that any of this is big enough on its own to actually deal with the fundamental structures of power that need to be challenged. Here we talk about nothing less than a state. So the left will have to rethink its theoretical and tactical apparatus.

#### Existential fears need not be settler projections of demise but can be contingently appropriated to reverse indigenous erasure

Weiss 15—Ph.D. candidate, Anthropology, University of Chicago (Joseph, “UNSETTLING FUTURES: HAIDA FUTURE-MAKING, POLITICS AND MOBILITY IN THE SETTLER COLONIAL PRESENT,” Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Division of Social Sciences, Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago, December 2015, 223-232, dml)

And yet, something has changed in this landscape from the initial erasures of Native futurity we drew out in the first chapter. In the narratives of colonial actors like Duncan Campbell Scott, it was absolutely clear that “Indians” were disappearing because their social worlds were being superseded by more “civilized” ways of living and being, ones that these Native subjects would also, inevitably, in the end, adopt (or failing that, perish outright). There was a future. It was simply a settler one. But the nightmare futures of that my Haida interlocutors ward against in their own future-making reach beyond Haida life alone. Environmental collapse, most dramatically, threatens the sustainability of all life; toxins in the land and the waters threaten human lives regardless of their relative indigeneity, race, or gender (e.g. Choy 2011; Crate 2011). Put another way, the impetus for non-Haida (and non-First Nations subjects more generally) to be “united against Enbridge” with their indigenous neighbours comes in no small part because an oil spill also profoundly threatens the lives and livelihoods of non-Aboriginal coastal residents, a fact which Masa Takei, among others, made clear in Chapter 3. Nor is the anxiety that young people might abandon their small town to pursue economic and educational advantage in an urban context limited to reserve communities. Instead, the compulsions of capitalist economic life compel such migrations throughout the globe. The nightmare futures that Haida people constitute alternative futures to ward against are not just future of indigenous erasure under settler colonialism. They are erasures of settler society itself.

There is thus an extraordinary political claim embedded in Haida future-making, a claim which gains its power precisely because Haida future-making as we have seen it does not (perhaps cannot) escape from the larger field of settler-colonial determination. Instead, in Haida future-making we find the implicit assertion that Haida people can make futures that address the dilemmas of Haida and settler life alike, ones that can at least “navigate,” to borrow Appadurai’s phrasing, towards possible futures that do not end in absolute erasure. If Povinelli and Byrd are correct and settler liberal governance makes itself possible and legitimate through a perpetual deferral of the problems of the present, then part of the power of Haida future-making is to expose the threatening non-futures that might emerge out of this bracketed present, to expose as lie the liberal promise of a good life always yet to come and to attempt to constitute alternatives.

## Case

### AT: Boxell

#### Challenging the state is essential to challenging the monopoly of whiteness.

Dylan Miner 15. Wiisaakodewinini (Métis) artist, activist, and scholar, Director of the American Indian Studies Program and Associate Professor (RCAH) at Michigan State University, as well as member of the Justseeds artists collective. 10-1-2015. "Gaagegoo Dabakaanan miiniwaa Debenjigejig (No Borders, Indigenous Sovereignty)." Decolonization. https://decolonization.wordpress.com/2015/10/01/gaagegoo-dabakaanan-miiniwaa-debenjigejig-no-borders-indigenous-sovereignty/

What aesthetic or creative sovereignty means, exactly, is unclear. The opacity of Indigenous sovereignty is part of what makes it, as a concept, so powerful. Just as Idle No More was not entirely fixed, so too is Indigenous sovereignty somewhat indeterminate. It must be noted that sovereignty, in this context, is shorthand for self-determination or self-governance or autonomy and should not be understood in its purely Westphalian interpretation. Indigenous sovereignties existed long before – and will long after – the nation-state became the dominant global polity. Indigenous sovereignty – as a political manifestation that emerges from within Indigenous ontologies – is not limited by the nation-state, even if the settler-nation-state can still exert authority over it. While I am committed to reclaiming the aesthetics (can we talk about aesthetic self-determination?) from its Kantian colonization, both the ACC (a multiplicity of voices, of which I am a member) and I understand that there is an undeniable relationship between Indigenous sovereignty and the maintenance (or revitalization) of Indigenous aesthetics. All of this exists within colonialism and capitalism, but is not contained by it. I guess that is what I am trying to get at here: the nation-state can, in fact, be imagined away, if only we envisage living without it. Being utopian and desiring a place for true Indigenous liberation does not come from a place of naivety. To not imagine a way of being that is simultaneously beyond and before (and after) colonialism, is much more naïve. I’ve read Fanon and understand the ‘pitfalls of national consciousness’. Even so, imagining ‘other possible worlds,’ to borrow from the Zapatistas, is what we must all be struggling for. Didn’t the Zapatistas imagine away the nation-state, while also working within it? If you read the EZLN communiqués, you will certainly see how the Zapatistas imagined away the nation-state and, at the same time, created alternative governance models (caracoles). As I write this article, Indigenous communities are continuously forced to assert themselves against capitalist and colonial encroachment. In the unceded territory commonly known as British Columbia, Unist´ot´en Camp is protecting the interests of Shkaakaamikwe (Mother Earth) by exercising their own sovereignty to stop the encroachment of big oil in their traditional territory. Earlier this autumn in Anishinaabewaki, the Indigenous lands that we know by the Dakota name Mne Sota (Minnesota), Anishinaabe harvesters are confronting the Minnesota state government as it interferes in their harvesting of manoomin (wild rice) and giigoonyag (fish). Would imagining away the nation-state mean that you or I, or folks harvesting manoomin in Minnesota or that the Unist´ot´en resistance to oil pipelines, would not face state confrontation or enforcement by the nation-state? Likely no. Does the presence of continuous and uninterrupted self-governance by Indigenous nations or tribes or bands somehow exist outside the presence of the settler-colonial nation-state? Of course not. However, thinking (and living) beyond the limits of the nation-state can do something else. What would happen if we collectively imagine true sovereignty – or something else that better describes Indigenous autonomy and self-determination? I believe that it is up to us – and the ancestors and spirits and rocks and land and water, among others – to prefigure something else.

#### Foreclosing institutions is a dead end to solve material violence – refusal relies on a flawed inside/outside binary that naturalizes settlerism

Petrossiants 20. (Andreas Petrossiants is the editorial assistant for E-Flux. Inside and Out: The Edges to Critique. June 2020. E-Flux. Journal #110. <https://www.e-flux.com/journal/110/335739/inside-and-out-the-edges-to-critique/> //shree)

In such a matrix, there are two broad categories applied to artists working in a critical register. The first is “going inside,” with the intention to subvert or usurp the operating protocols of the institution, or to “show the public,” through forms of pedagogy, what is otherwise obfuscated or invisibilized in other domains. Different “waves” of institutional critique have either taken this strategy at face value (Hans Haacke, let’s say), or, following the influence of the social sciences, imagined this posture of mitigating complicity as the only position from which critique is possible—what Andrea Fraser termed “critically-reflexive site-specificity.” The second category, “going outside,” sometimes referred to as “dropping out,” is applied when artists build other institutions, collectively organized/owned or not, or refuse the circuits of art’s commodification. Keti Chukhrov’s description of anti-capitalist critique that operates within capitalist ideology applies to critical art as well. In a forthcoming book she remarks:

The capitalist undercurrent of … emancipatory and critical theories functions not as a program to exit from capitalism, but rather as the radicalization of the impossibility of this exit … The planning and ideological framework is counter-capitalist, but the contents remain either nihilist, or reproduce the status quo of capitalist political economy and sociality in the form of its critique.

The entrance into the walls, apparatuses, protocols, and functions of the institution depends on defining where a border between inside and out can be constituted: a closed door now opened, a computer server now unlocked, a managerial role now usurped, a philanthropy revenue stream now rerouted. And, most often, the fact that these gestures reify or legitimize the very structure being engaged is taken as inevitable.

That said, “dropping out,” unlike going inside, continues to be considered a political strategy in itself. Tactics such as boycotts, general strikes, and sabotage, all carrying with them an element of refusal, are consistently welded to the belief that dropping out is possible. But, it’s different in cultural production. As Vishmidt reminds us, the “key significance” of the many generations of institutional critique “was in laying a track between the critique of institutions and critique of infrastructures; that is, not simply the formal but the material conditions that located the institution in an expanded field of structural violence.” How does one escape from the field if it determines from where, and how, one begins that very movement? Not just the “social field,” per Bourdieu, but rather the entire cultural landscape that is imaged as other to work?

When we think through this assumed differentiation between calculated subversion and performative refusal, it can be seen to mirror other binary sets of possibilities from Marxian aesthetic theory, social historiography, and postcolonial theory: reform vs. revolution, stadial progress vs. historical rupture, organized labor vs. autonomist self-organization, and so on. How then to avoid the mistaken belief that such vectors of action (going in and going out) take place in wholly different sites of contention, when they operate along one border sketched by the institution itself?

### Pic---1NC

#### The AFF gives way to universal commodification and economization of every aspect of life.

P.W. Zuidhof 12, Associate Professor in European political economy in the European Studies program in the Department of History, European Studies and Religious Studies at the University of Amsterdam, *Imagining Markets: The Discursive Politics of Neoliberalism,* 2012, Pages 4-11.

Neoliberalism as a Discursive Politics of the Market

Many critics of neoliberalism have tried to capture the exuberance of the market imagery in neoliberalism. The cultural critic Thomas Frank for instance, documents in One Market under God (2001) how the market has become an important cultural icon which invaded public discourse and our cultural imaginations. Frank (2001, 29) for instance points out how a variety of cultural techniques, ranging from advertising, business journalism, management books, to cultural studies have created a brand of “market populism” – he cites Newsweek columnist Robert Samuelson’s locution “the Market ‘R’ Us” – in which ‘the market’ is equated with ‘the people’ to the point that the market became to be seen as more democratic than conventional institutions of a democracy. In an attempt to address the excessive market imagery of neoliberalism, critics resort to all sorts of market-based neologisms. Like Thomas Frank, one turns for instance to religious imagery to speak of neoliberalism as a “market theology,” or the gospel of “freemarket religion” (e.g. Cox 1999). In secular terms, one invokes the image of a “free market mythology” (viz. Perelman 2006) or “The Cult of the Market” (Boldeman 2011). The market is especially concatenated with political images, as in Frank’s “market populism,” or when neoliberalism is put down as a form of “market democracy” (Chomsky 1999), “market liberalism,” or instead described as a form of “market dictatorship” (Attali 1997). The specter of terrorism is once more raised to bring out the character of neoliberalism, for instance by Henry Giroux in his book, The Terror of Neoliberalism (2004). It has especially become fashionable to refer to neoliberalism and its policies as a form of “market fundamentalism,” a depiction that has been popularized by the likes of George Soros (e.g. 1998) and notably Joseph Stiglitz (2002) in his critique of the IMF. These examples indicate that with neoliberalism, the market has emerged as a powerful image that spectacularly altered our thought and speech not only in political and policy discourse but public discourse at large. I imagine that major market philosophers from the past such as Adam Smith, Karl Marx and even Friedrich Hayek or Milton Friedman would have great difficulties understanding what is meant by some of these terms. The perceived exuberance of neoliberalism can therefore be traced to how the image of the ‘market’ was mobilized and developed into a powerful signifier to re-imagine and rearticulate many important spheres of life.

The New Yorker cartoon pointedly makes clear that neoliberalism relies on the work of metaphor. Rather than straightforwardly instructing the participants in the boardroom that terrorism should be fought at the market, the message is to fight terrorism as if it were a market. Neoliberalism, I would claim, always entails mobilizing the market in a metaphorical sense. The message of neoliberalism is consistently a metaphorical one: think of … as a market, (and govern it accordingly).6 Neoliberalism invites us to imagine virtually everything as a market, ranging from health care, universities to the military, pensions, personal relationships, families, ethics, aesthetics and the state and politics itself. The excessive quality of neoliberalism is therefore found in its use of the market as a metaphor and its ability to displace the state.

The assessment in this thesis of the challenge of neoliberalism and its politics of the market, will therefore begin by distinguishing literal references to the market from metaphorical ones. Others pointed out before that in assessing the politics of markets it is important to recognize that we often speak of markets in metaphorical terms. In Contested Commodities, the legal philosopher Margaret Radin (1996) begins her analysis of what goods can properly be bought and sold, by distinguishing literal from metaphorical markets. As against literal markets where goods are exchanged for money, at metaphorical markets there are no actual exchanges involving money but entails interactions that “are talked about as if they did” (3). Radin employs the term market rhetoric to refer to the vocabulary or discourse in which metaphorical markets emerge. Radin claims that on a theoretical level for instance, Chicago scholars such as Becker and Posner engage in market rhetoric, and “in doing so they extend the market, metaphorically at least, beyond what we are conventionally comfortable with” (4). In her view, by conflating literal and metaphorical markets, market rhetoric may give way to what she calls universal commodification. It means that goods are solely viewed as alienable market goods and only have exchange value. In her book, Radin argues for the importance of incomplete commodification. This is the view that complete commodification is not, and should not be applicable to most cases of goods. Without further engaging with the details of Radin’s account, her conceptual distinction between literal and metaphorical markets raises an important insight. Among other things, her book analyzes some of the normative implications of the metaphorical extension of the market. While she exclusively concentrates on the metaphorical extension of the market in (mostly economic) theory, I would argue that neoliberalism is founded on an analogous use of metaphorical markets, but in political discourse. Neoliberalism relies on metaphorical markets and market rhetoric to rearticulate our political understandings. Without her calling it as such, Radin’s book could be read as a normative analysis of the metaphorical politics of neoliberalism.

By drawing attention to the fact that neoliberalism relies on metaphorical markets and market rhetoric, the intellectual challenge posed by neoliberalism is to further specify the nature of its political project. Apart from the question which will be addressed in chapter 3, whether neoliberalism should be construed as either ideology, policy agenda or rather something else, it needs to be determined what kind of political project it amounts to. The hypothesis of this thesis is that neoliberalism is best understood as a kind of discursive politics. By discursive politics, I broadly mean a type of politics that achieves its goals discursively, by rearticulating a prior structure of understanding. Every form of politics of course avails itself of discourse, for example when ‘neoliberals’ call for the liberalization of certain markets. The concern here is however not with this more narrowly defined discourse of politics, but rather with the politics of discourse (viz. Connolly 1993, 221).

Put very schematically – although the dividing lines are ultimately hard to draw – my idea of neoliberalism as a discursive politics differs from conventional conceptions of politics in claiming that in important respects neoliberalism depends on language and discursive means to attain political effects. The basic idea is that discursive interventions impact the way we perceive the organization of the social world and how we conceive of the good life. Where traditional, for instance liberal conceptions of politics take the organization of social life largely as given and view politics as a contest of preferences and opinions, discursive politics affects the constitution of our social world and our conceptions of the good life. Rather than asking for the liberalization of markets, the discursive politics of neoliberalism mobilizes the metaphor of the market to rearticulate how we to think of a certain area of life.

The idea of discursive politics as pursued in this thesis, is not unique but inspired by a longer tradition within poststructural political thought and discourse theory as found with Laclau and Mouffe (2001), Butler (1993, 1997), Shapiro (1981, 1984), or Connolly (1993). One of its insights is that discourse is inherently political because discursive constructions inevitably privilege certain aspects over others. The flip-side of this insight is however that any discursive construction is fundamentally unstable and subject to rearticulation. Laclau (e.g. Laclau 1996, 2000, 2008) at times emphasizes that rhetorical displacements or “tropological substitutions” are indispensable in mediating the rearticulation of existing discursive structures. Shifts in discourse are always tropological as they allow for the making and breaking of the discursive field. The political power of metaphor then is its capacity to rearticulate a certain discursive field. Since the market metaphor performs such a function in neoliberalism, it seems particularly relevant to approach neoliberalism as a discursive form of politics. Neoliberalism is then best characterized as the discursive politics of the market metaphor. Not all politics surrounding neoliberalism is always necessarily discursive in this strong sense and no doubt also amounts to conventional contests over preferences and opinions. Our first brush with neoliberalism here however suggests that its most important challenge is its discursive politics.

This thesis studies the discursive politics of neoliberalism, both theoretically and empirically. Since the discursive politics of the market continues to have a tremendous impact on contemporary political discourse, it is relevant to assess its effects. As the discursive market politics of neoliberalism particularly challenges our traditional views of the interrelation between the market and the state, the main question is to determine how the discursive politics of neoliberalism re-imagines the way this relation is perceived. This way, neoliberalism calls for a re-evaluation of the intersections between economics and politics. How do the manifold ways of spreading market metaphors displace and destabilize existing understandings of the relation between markets and states? What is at stake in the invitation of neoliberalism to imagine markets for everything and especially as a substitute for the state? As we will see, the central issue behind neoliberalism’s rewriting of the relation between the market and the state is that the latter challenge our traditional view of how to govern and how to conceive of government. The argument of this thesis is that the discursive market politics of neoliberalism inaugurates new ways of conceiving of government. The main task of this thesis is to assess exactly how neoliberalism is rewriting our view of government, and to determine what its political consequences are.

#### Their description of white people as the “trust” and the “monopolization” of ways of life such as thought turns the case. It reinforces corporatization of education and normalizes inequitable power structures.

Kip Austin Hinton 15, Assistant Professor, The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, “Should We Use a Capital Framework to Understand Culture? Applying Cultural Capital to Communities of Color,” Equity & Excellence in Education, 48(2), 299-319, 2015.

Influence of an Economic Metaphor on Communities of Color

It makes sense for a neoliberal economist to embrace the prism of social or cultural capital, because economic research frequently interprets the world as a primarily economic sphere. But what about when a social justice educator embraces social or cultural capital? Many social justice advocates do not define the world in economic terms, and do not see market forces as the primary solution to oppressive systems. Capitalism promotes hegemony, not social justice. The agenda of capital has always run counter to the goals of community empowerment: “Within this transformed system, capital demanded that the household function as a factory” (Perelman, 2000, p. 74). According to Weber, the mere existence of family relationships presents an obstacle to capitalism (Collins, 1986, p. 269). Decades ago, Apple (1971) warned that schools were slipping into a marketplace orientation, prioritizing “maintenance of the same dominant world-view” (p. 27). Public institutions have indeed become more market-driven, focused on capital in a way that disempowers communities of color, making it harder to enact democratic reforms (Apple, 2006; Clawson & Leiblum, 2008). Metaphorical capital does not contribute to this directly, but rather indirectly—through metaphor.

Across metaphorical capitals, each framework is fundamentally economic. Research on funds of knowledge and community cultural wealth mimic economic vocabulary without a conception of investment or of supply and demand. Looking to the source, Bourdieu’s (1977) prominent theories are influenced by the economic work of Marx (2011). This makes it particularly notable that Bourdieu himself ignores most aspects of economic capital when he applies it to cultural interaction. Bourdieu does not theorize systems of exchange, return on investment, loans, entrepreneurship, or the actions of cultural capitalists. In fact, Bourdieu’s original concept is somewhat analogous to money, not to capital. Successive theorists have been reluctant to move beyond Bourdieu’s initial, imprecise articulations (Dika & Singh, 2002; Lin, 1999). So, although it may be unusual to come across a theory of race that ignores racism, it is common for a theory of capital to ignore capitalism.

Metaphors have influence. In a metaphor, one domain of human thought is superimposed on a different domain, creating important influence on the receiving domain (Barcelona, 2003). Lakoff (2004) and others have explained how a repeated metaphor reifies in our consciousness, even altering neural processes (Kovecses, 2010). The way any issue is framed, writes Mehta (2013), ¨ “changes the nature of the debate” (p. 292). A problem’s definition is a political consideration, deeply influencing which questions we ask, and which solutions we consider (Lakoff & Pinker, 2007; Sandikcioglu, 2003). This is illustrated by prominent metaphors in the languages of industrialized nations. We use money metaphors to think about time (spend time, living on borrowed time); we use war metaphors to think about arguments (defend a position, surrender a point). As Lakoff and Johnson (2003) explain, we do not explain arguments using a dance metaphor (p. 5), but if we did, it would influence the way we see our opponents/partners.

In the case of culture, are there limits to what education researchers are willing to characterize as capital? Derrida and Moore (1974) warn us of “deploying” metaphors “without limit”: “Consequently the reassuring dichotomy between the metaphorical and the proper is exploded” (p. 74). S. Smith and Kulynych (2002) claim social capital confuses analytical categories because capital is inextricably tied to economic discourse; this critique applies to all forms of metaphorical capital. In public consciousness, capital will not be divorced from capitalism. Deployments of metaphorical capital, therefore, impose the economic worldview of capitalism. These theories position capital and wealth as the normal ways of defining a relationship. Even if such theories were revised to reflect money instead (e.g., “cultural currency”), they would still precariously assume that human interaction can and should be explained in economic terms.

Metaphorical capital advances an economic framework that interprets educational or cultural situations as capitalist, neoliberal, and market-based. We have adopted a specific paradigm, and now that paradigm dictates policy options (P. Hall, 1993). Neoliberal solutions, including standardized testing and charter schools, already dominate education reform (Jones & Vagle, 2013). Political and social critiques are central to critical race theory—yet are marginalized by neoliberal discourse. It is significant that Friedman (1997), one of the most influential proponents of capital and capitalism, advocated privatization of all public schools through vouchers. Rather than functioning as independent fields, education and economics are deeply connected, often in destructive ways. In the past decades, education research has seen an increase in both capitalrelated social theory and the influence of economics. Privatization and corporatization have increased throughout education systems (Saltman, 2012). Aside from the direct harm caused by market-based reform (Burch, 2009; Saltman, 2000), corporatization has reinforced the economic worldview that was embodied by metaphorical capital. Education reports are filled with finance-related vocabulary: funds, investment, value-added, stakeholder, productivity, buy-in. Economic perspectives infringe on discussions about students, even when topics are ostensibly unrelated to money. “This is the extent of capitalism’s hegemony, that it has colonized our capacity to imagine alternatives” (Hickel & Khan, 2012, p. 221). Language influences thought, and educators begin to accept the market mindset. We normalize an inequitable power structure. The capitalist viewpoint becomes the normal way to see everything, and its opportunistic oppression, likewise, becomes normal. It is not surprising, then, that the assets of communities of color go unrecognized—and as I write this, I struggle to explain the limitations of a capitalist frame without reproducing that frame, with my problematic word choice, “assets.”

Freire (1970) has been influential among scholars who rely on metaphorical capital to write about students of color. It is significant that Freire employs economic metaphors to represent the problem (Oughton, 2010): “Banking education” is his name for the method that dehumanizes students (Freire, 1970, p. 73). Freire recognizes economic power as a destructive force at play in the lives of the poor. He consistently opposes multiple elements of the neoliberal agenda, especially the prioritization of capital (Carnoy, 1998; Freire, 1998). Throughout his work, Freire offers ways to counter the commodification of students and promote true democracy (Marginson, 2006). A Freirean analysis of metaphorical capitals, then, notices the neglect of power relations and the depiction of human relationships as economic exchanges.

Hegemonic cultural values, says Gramsci (2011), are those that are accepted as inevitable. The status quo of the economic system cannot be separated from the status quo of the education system. Gramsci embraces education, believing the development of working class intellectuals will reshape the status quo. Gramsci recognizes resistance and promotes agency, in ways that are echoed by community cultural wealth. Though Gramsci opposes economism, he never claims culture, education, and economics are independent (Jessop & Sum, 2006). These are multiple facets of a single, comprehensive system of power. That is to say, there is no such thing as a non-economic policy goal. Do we choose capital as a metaphor because it is the best metaphor, or because it is the one we are familiar with? A Gramscian analysis by Torres (2013) examines the way a neoliberal framework asserts itself as common sense within educational reforms. In a capitalist system, power is allocated to the financially powerful, structuring our self-definitions. As participants in a capitalist system, capital is our common sense, our default, so it is not a surprise that we append the word even when it is unnecessary. These are “tacit, discursive endorsements of neoliberal ideology” (Ayers, 2005, p. 535). From a social justice perspective, metaphors are not arbitrary tools to assign without consequence. They make claims about truth, using rhetoric that “cannot be neutral” (Derrida & Moore, 1974, p. 41). Discourse matters, whether within controversies over Native American mascots (King & Springwood, 2001) or a politician’s description of a war as a “crusade” (Kellner, 2007). Power relations connect seemingly innocuous discursive practices to broader practices of political rhetoric, discrimination, and global financial institutions (McKenna, 2004). In an analysis of community college mission statements, Ayers (2005) concludes that “neoliberal discourse” directs attention to market concerns, so “curriculum is likely to become heavily laden with a market ideology that reinforces and reproduces power asymmetries” (p. 546). By repeating neoliberal vocabulary, frameworks of metaphorical capital have potentially weakened democracy by re-inscribing a framework of capitalism. Even when a particular study’s content works against oppression, language choices may not.

Although market-based education reforms have become more powerful, those who promulgate theories of metaphorical capital have become less likely to have academic understanding of capital itself (Dika & Singh, 2002). Cultural neglect of students of color cannot be logically separated from the economic exclusion they face, as irrelevant curriculum leads to higher pushout rates (M. Fine, 1991; Solorzano & Yosso, 2001). Yes, the cultures of black, Latina/o, Native ´ American, and Asian American students deserve equal footing inside classrooms, and this is true even—or especially—when those cultural practices are not easily framed as a form of capital. I am inspired by Yosso (2005) in her referral to Anzaldua’s (1990) call for a more empowering ´ theory. Yet I think of Lorde’s (1984) warning, “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house,” because those tools keep a part of us stuck within “the master’s relationships” (p. 123). Wealth and capital are the capitalist’s tools, the capitalist’s relationships. These are not ethical relationships (Schweickart, 2002). The dominance of financial vocabulary empowers non-human (and inhumane) relationships, through capitalism. These are the relationships between supply and demand; between capital and commodity; between powerful and powerless; between legislation and corporation. As argued by Giroux and Giroux (2006), global capital is responsible for making the wealth and achievement gaps worse for black and Latina/o communities.

I specifically claim that this supposed metaphorical capital is not capital at all. As social justice researchers, we are not neutral; we seek ways to fight oppressive conditions. Yet by basing our metaphors on capital, our theoretical frameworks promote a worldview that is inconsistent with our own goals. Letting go of the metaphor of capital, we may find more relevant and more ethical ways to theorize culture.

### AT: Bhambra & Holmwood

#### Liberalism does not enable genocide---attempts to abandon it will fail.

Charles MILLS 12, the John Evans Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy at Northwestern University [“Occupy Liberalism! Or, Ten Reasons Why Liberalism Cannot Be Retrieved for Radicalism,” *Radical Philosophy Review* 15(2): 305-323, http://pages.uoregon.edu/koopman/siap/readings/Mills\_Charles\_RPR.pdf]

From this perspective, it will be appreciated that liberalism is not a monolith but an umbrella term for a variety of positions. Here are some examples-some familiar, some perhaps less so:¶ Varieties of Liberalism¶ Left-wing (social democratic) vs. Right-wing (market conservative) Kantian vs. Lockean¶ Contractarian vs. Utilitarian Corporate vs. Democratic Social vs. Individualist Comprehensive vs. Political¶ Ideal-theory vs. Non-ideal-theory Patriarchal vs. Feminist Imperial vs. Anti-imperial Racial vs. Anti-racial Color-blind vs. Color-conscious¶ Etc.¶ It is not the case, of course, that these different species of liberalism have been equally represented in the ideational sphere, or equally implemented in the institutional sphere. On the contrary, some have been dominant while others have been subordinate, and some have never, at least in the full sense, been implemented at all. But nonetheless, I suggest they all count as liberalisms and as such they are all supposed to have certain elements in common, even those characterized by gender and racial exclusions. (My motivation for making these last varieties of liberalism rather than deviations from liberalism is precisely to challenge liberalism's self- congratulatory history, which holds an idealized Platonized liberalism aloft, untainted by its actual record of complicity with oppressive social systems.) So the initial question we should always ask people making generalizations about "liberalism" is: What particular variety of liberalism do you mean?¶ And are your generalizations really true about all the possible kinds of liberalism, or only a subset?¶ Here is a characterization of liberalism from a very respectable source, the British political theorist, John Gray:¶ Common to all variants of the liberal tradition is a definite conception, distinctively modern in character, of man and society.... It is individualist, in that it asserts the moral primacy of the person against the claims of any social collectivity; egalitarian, inasmuch as it confers on all men the same moral status and denies the relevance to legal or political order of differences in moral worth among human beings; universalist, affirming the moral unity of the human species and according a secondary importance to specific historic associations and cultural forms; and meliorist in its affirmation of the corrigibility and improvability of all social institutions and political arrangements. It is this conception of man and society which gives liberalism a definite identity which transcends its vast internal variety and complexity.2¶ What generate the different varieties of liberalism are different concepts of individualism, different claims about how egalitarianism should be construed or realized, more or less inclusionary readings of universalism (Gray's characterization sanitizes liberalism's actual sexist and racist history), different views of what count as desirable improvements, conflicting normative balancings of liberal values (freedom, equality) and competing theoretical prognoses about how best they can be realized in the light of (contested) socio-historical facts. The huge potential for disagreement about all of these explains how a common liberal core can produce such a wide range of variants. Moreover, we need to take into account not merely the spectrum of actual liberalisms but also hypothetical liberalisms that could be generated through novel framings of some or all of the above. So one would need to differentiate dominant versions of liberalism from oppositional versions, and actual from possible variants.¶ Once the breadth of the range of liberalisms is appreciated-dominant and subordinate, actual and potential-the obvious question then raised is: Even if actual dominant liberalisms have been conservative in various ways (corporate, patriarchal, racist) why does this rule out the development of emancipatory, radical liberalisms?¶ One kind of answer is the following (call this the internalist answer): Because there is an immanent conceptual/normative logic to liberalism as a political ideology that precludes any emancipatory development of it.¶ Another kind of answer is the following (call this the externalist answer): It doesn't. The historic domination of conservative exclusionary liberalisms is the result of group interests, group power, and successful group political projects. Apparent internal conceptual/normative barriers to an emancipatory liberalism can be successfully negotiated by drawing on the conceptual/normative resources of liberalism itself, in conjunction with a revisionist socio-historical picture of modernity.¶ Most self-described radicals would endorse-indeed, reflexively, as an obvious truth-the first answer. But as indicated from the beginning, I think the second answer is actually the correct one. The obstacles to developing a "radical liberalism" are, in my opinion, primarily externalist in nature: material group interests, and the way they have shaped hegemonic varieties of liberalism. So I think we need to try to justify a radical agenda with the normative resources of liberalism rather than writing off liberalism. Since liberalism has always been the dominant ideology in the United States, and is now globally hegemonic, such a project would have the great ideological advantage of appealing to values and principles that most people already endorse. All projects of egalitarian social transformation are going to face a combination of material, political, and ideological obstacles, but this strategy would at least reduce somewhat the dimensions of the last. One would be trying to win mass support for policies that-and the challenge will, of course, be to demonstrate this-are justifiable by majoritarian norms, once reconceived and put in conjunction with facts not always familiar to the majority. Material barriers (vested group interests) and political barriers (organizational difficulties) will of course remain. But they will constitute a general obstacle for all egalitarian political programs, and as such cannot be claimed to be peculiar problems for an emancipatory liberalism.¶ But the contention will be that such a liberalism cannot be developed. Why? Here are ten familiar objections, variants of internalism, and my replies to them.¶ Ten Reasons Why Liberalism Cannot Be Radicalized (And My Replies)¶ 1. Liberalism Has an Asocial, Atomic Individualist Ontology¶ This is one of the oldest radical critiques of liberalism; it can be found in Marx's derisive comments, for example in the Grundrisse, about the "Robinsonades" of the social contract theory whose "golden age" (1650-1800) had long passed by the time he began his intellectual and political career:¶ The individual and isolated hunter or fisher who forms the starting-point with Smith and Ricardo belongs to the insipid illusions of the eighteenth century. They are Robinson Crusoe stories .... no more based on such a naturalism than is Rousseau's contrat social which makes naturally independent individuals come in contact and have mutual intercourse by contract .... Man is in the most literal sense of the word a zoon politikon, not only a social animal, but an animal which can develop into an individual only in society. Production by individuals outside society ... is as great an absurdity as the idea of the development of language without individuals living together and talking to one another.3¶ But several replies can be made to this indictment. To begin with, even if the accusation is true of contractarian liberalism, not all liberalisms are contractarian. Utilitarian liberalism rests on different theoretical foundations, as does the late nineteenth-century British liberalism of T. H. Green and his colleagues: a Hegelian, social liberalism. 4 Closer to home, of course, we have John Dewey's brand of liberalism. Moreover, even within the social contract tradition, resources exist for contesting the assumptions of the Hobbesian/Lockean version of the contract. Rousseau's Discourse on the Origins of Inequality (1755) (nowhere given proper credit by Marx5) rethinks the "contract" to make it a contract entered into after the formation of society, and thus the creation of socialized human beings. So the ontology presupposed is explicitly a social one. In any case, the contemporary revival of contractarianism initiated by John Rawls's 1971 A Theory of justice makes the contract a thought experiment, a "device of representation," rather than a literal or even metaphorical anthropological account. The communitarian/ contractarian debates of the 1980s onwards recapitulated much of the "asocial" critique of contractarian liberalism (though usually without a radical edge). But as Rawls pointed out against Michael Sandel, for example, one needs to distinguish the figures in the thought experiment from real human beings.6 And radicals should be wary about accepting a communitarian ontology and claims about the general good that deny or marginalize the dynamics of group domination in actual societies represented as "communities." The great virtue of contractarian liberal individualism is the conceptual room it provides for hegemonic norms to be critically evaluated through the epistemic and moral distancing from Sittlichkeit that the contract, as an intellectual device, provides.¶ 2. Liberalism Cannot Recognize Groups and Group Oppression in Its Ontology-I (Macro)¶ The second point needs to be logically distinguished from the first, since a theory could acknowledge the social shaping of individuals while denying that group oppression is central to that shaping. (So #1 is necessary, but not sufficient, for #2.) The Marxist critique, of course, was supposed to encapsulate both points: people were shaped by society and society (post- "primitive communism") was class-dominated. The ontology was social and it was an ontology of class. Today radicals would demand a richer ontology that can accommodate the realities of gender and racial oppression also. But whatever candidates are put forward, the, key claim is that a liberal framework cannot accommodate an ontology of groups in relations of domination and subordination. To the extent that liberalism recognizes social groups, these are basically conceived of as voluntary associations that one chooses to join or not join, which is obviously very different from, say, class, race, and gender memberships.¶ But this evasive ontology, which obfuscates the most central and obvious fact about all societies since humanity exited the hunting-and-gathering stage-viz., that they are characterized by oppressions of one kind or another-is not a definitional constituent of liberalism. Liberalism has certainly recognized some kinds of oppression: the absolutism it opposed in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, the Nazism and Stalinism it opposed in the twentieth century. Liberalism's failure to systematically address structural oppression in supposedly liberal-democratic societies is a contingent artifact of the group perspectives and group interests privileged by those structures, not an intrinsic feature of liberalism's conceptual apparatus.¶ In the preface to her recent Analyzing Oppression, Ann Cudd makes a striking point: that hers is the first book-length treatment of the subject in the analytic tradition. 7 Philosophy, the discipline whose special mandate it is to illuminate justice and injustice for us, has had very little to say about injustice and oppression because of the social background of the majority of its thinkers. In political theory and political philosophy, the theorists who developed the dominant varieties of liberalism have come overwhelmingly from the hegemonic groups of the liberal social order (bourgeois white males). So it is really not surprising that, given this background, their socio- political and epistemic standpoint has tended to reproduce rather than challenge group privilege.¶ Consider Rawls, famously weak on gender and with next to nothing to say about race. Rawlsian "ideal theory," which has dominated mainstream political philosophy for the last four decades, marginalizes such concerns not contingently but structurally. If your focus from the start is principles of distributive justice for a "well-ordered society," then social oppression cannot be part of the picture, since by definition an oppressive society is not a well-ordered one. As Cudd points out, A Theory of justice "leaves injustice virtually untheorized," operating on the assumption "that injustice is merely the negation of justice." 8 But radically unjust societies-those characterized by major rather than minor deviations from ideality-will be different from just societies not merely morally but metaphysically. What Cudd calls "non- voluntary social groups" will be central to their makeup, so that a conceptualization of such groups must be central to any adequate account of social oppression: "without positing social groups as causally efficacious entities, we cannot explain oppression." Contra the conventional wisdom in radical circles, however, she is insistent that the ontology of such groups can be explained "[using] current social science, in the form of cognitive psychology and modern economic theory, and situat[ing] itself in the Anglo-American tradition of liberal political philosophy."9 Identifying "intentionalist" and "structuralist" approaches as the two broad categories of competing theorizations of social groups, she recommends as the best option¶ a compatibilist position, holding that while all action is intentionally guided, many of the constraints within which we act are socially determined and beyond the control of the currently acting individual; to put a slogan on it, intentions dynamically interact within social structures .... My theory of nonvoluntary social groups fits the description of what Philip Pettit calls "holistic individualism," which means that the social regularities associated with nonvoluntary social groups supervene on intentional states, and at the same time, group membership in these and voluntary social groups partly constitutes the intentional states of individuals. 10¶ If Cudd is right, then, such a theorization can indeed be developed within a liberal framework, using the resources of analytic social and normative theory. But such a development of the theory is not merely permissible, but should be seen as mandatory, given liberalism's nominal commitment to individualism, egalitarianism, universalism, and meliorism. These values simply cannot be achieved unless the obstacles to their realization are identified and theorized. Social-democratic (left) liberalism, feminist liberalism, black liberalism, all historically represent attempts to take these structural realities into account for the purposes of rethinking dominant liberalism. 11 They are attempts to get right, to map accurately, the actual ontology of the societies for which liberalism is prescribing principles of justice. What Cudd's book demonstrates is that it is the ignoring of this ontology of group domination that is the real betrayal of the liberal project. A well-ordered society will not have nonvoluntary social groups as part of its ontology. So the path to the "realistic utopia" Rawls is supposedly outlining would crucially require normative prescriptions for eliminating such groups. That no such guidelines are offered is undeniably an indictment of ideal-theory liberalism, which is thereby exposed as both epistemologically and ontologically inadequate. But that does not rule out a reconceptualized liberalism, a non-ideal-theory liberalism that, starting from a different social metaphysic, requires a different normative strategy for theorizing justice.¶ 3. Liberalism Cannot Recognize Groups and Group Oppression in Its Ontology-II (Micro)¶ But (it will be replied) liberalism suffers from a deeper theoretical inadequacy. Even if it may be conceded that liberal theory can recognize oppression at the macro-level, it will be argued that its individualism prevents it from recognizing how profoundly, at the micro-level, individuals are shaped by structures of social oppression. Class, race, and gender belongings penetrate deeply into the ontology of the individual in ways rendered opaque (it will be claimed) by liberalism's foundational individualism.¶ But what those seeking to retrieve liberalism would point out is that we need to distinguish different senses of "individualism." The individualism that is foundational to liberalism is a normative individualism (as in the Gray quote above), which makes individuals rather than social collectivities the locus of value. But that does not require any denial that individuals are shaped in their character (the "second nature" famously highlighted by left theory) by oppressive social forces and related group memberships. Once the first two criticisms have been refuted-that liberal individuals cannot be "social," and that the involuntary group memberships central to the social in oppressive societies cannot be accommodated within a liberal framework-then this third criticism collapses with them also. One can without inconsistency affirm both the value of the individual and the importance of recognizing how the individual is socially molded, especially when the environing social structures are oppressive ones. As already noted, dominant liberalism tends to ignore or marginalize such constraints, assuming as its representative figures individuals not merely morally equal, but socially recognized as morally equal, and equi-powerful rather than group- differentiated into the privileged and the subordinated. But this misleading normative and descriptive picture is a function of a political agenda complicit with the status quo, not a necessary implication of liberalism's core assumptions. A revisionist, radical liberalism would make the analysis of group oppression, the denial of equal standing to the majority of the population, and their impact on the individual's ontology, a theoretical priority. Thus Cudd's book, after explicating the ontology of involuntary groups, goes on to detail the various different ways, through violence, economic constraint, discrimination, group harassment, and the internalization of psychological oppression, that the subordinated are shaped by group domination.12 But nothing in her account is meant to imply either that they thereby cease to be individuals, or that their involuntary group memberships preclude a normative liberal condemnation of the injustice of their treatment.

#### Humanism is contingently good and alternatives are far worse

Lester 12 – Alan Lester, Director of Interdisciplinary Research, Professor of Historical Geography, and Co-Director of the Colonial and Postcolonial Studies Network at the University of Sussex, 2012 (*Humanism, Race and the Colonial Frontier*, Published of the Institute of British Geographers, Volume 37, Issue 1, p. 132-148) //Xain

Anderson argues that it is not an issue of extending humanity to … negatively racialised people, but of putting into question that from which such people have been excluded – that which, for liberal discourse, remains unproblematised. (2007, 199) I fear, however, that if we direct attention away from histories of humanism’s failure to deal with difference and to render that difference compatible with its fundamental universalism, and if we overlook its proponents’ failed attempts to combat dispossession, murder and oppression; if our history of race is instead understood through a critique of humanity’s conceptual separation from nature, **we dilute the political potency of universalism. Historically, it was not humanism** that gave rise to racial innatism, it was the **specifically anti-humanist politics** of settlers forging new social assemblages through relations of violence on colonial frontiers. Settler communities became established social assemblages in their own right **specifically** **through the rejection of humanist interventions**. Perhaps, as Edward Said suggested, **we can learn from the implementation of humanist universalism in practice**, and insist **on its potential to combat racism**, and perhaps we can insist on the contemporary conceptual hybridisation of human–non-human entities too, without necessarily abandoning all the precepts of humanism (Said 2004; Todorov 2002). We do not necessarily need to accord a specific value to the human, separate from and above nature, in order to make a moral and political case for a fundamental human universalism that can be wielded strategically against racial violence. Nineteenth century humanitarians’ universalism was fundamentally conditioned by their belief that British culture stood at the apex of a hierarchical order of civilisations. From the mid-nineteenth century through to the mid-twentieth century, this ethnocentrism produced what Lyotard describes as ‘the flattening of differences, or the demand for a norm (“human nature”)’, that ‘carries with it its own forms of terror’ (cited Braun 2004, 1352). The intervention of Aboriginal Protection demonstrates that humanist universalism has the potential to inflict such terror (it was the Protectorate of Aborigines Office reincarnated that was responsible, later in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for Aboriginal Australia’s Stolen Generation, and it was the assimilationist vision of the Protectors’ equivalents in Canada that led to the abuses of the Residential Schools system). But we must not forget that **humanism’s alternatives,** founded upon principles of difference rather than commonality, **have the potential to do the same and even worse**. In the nineteenth century, Caribbean planters and then emigrant British settlers emphasised the multiplicity of the human species, **the absence of any universal ‘human nature’**, the **incorrigibility of difference**, in their **upholding of biological determinism**. Their assault on any notion of a fundamental commonality among human beings has **disconcerting points of intersection with the radical critique of humanism today**. The scientific argument of the nineteenth century that came closest to post-humanism’s insistence on the hybridity of humanity, promising to ‘close the ontological gap between human and non-human animals’ (Day 2008, 49), was the evolutionary theory of biological descent associated with Darwin, and yet this theory was adopted in Aotearoa New Zealand and other colonial sites **precisely to legitimate the potential extinction of other, ‘weaker’ races** in the face of British colonisation on the grounds of the natural law of a struggle for survival (Stenhouse 1999). Both the upholding and the rejection of human–nature binaries can thus result in racially oppressive actions, **depending on the contingent politics of specific social assemblages**. Nineteenth century colonial humanitarians, inspired as they were by an irredeemably ethnocentric and religiously exclusive form of universalism, at least combatted exterminatory settler discourses and practices at multiple sites of empire, and provided spaces on mission and protectorate stations in which indigenous peoples could be shielded to a very limited extent from dispossession and murder. They also, unintentionally, reproduced discourses of a civilising mission and of a universal humanity that could be deployed by anticolonial nationalists in other sites of empire that were never invaded to the same extent by settlers, in independence struggles from the mid-twentieth century. Finally, as Whatmore’s (2002) analysis of the Select Committee on Aborigines reveals, they provided juridical narratives that are part of the arsenal of weapons that indigenous peoples can wield in attempts to claim redress and recompense in a postcolonial world. The politics of humanism in practice, then, was riddled with contradiction, fraught with particularity and latent with varying possibilities. It could be relatively progressive and liberatory; it could be dispossessive and culturally genocidal. Within its repertoire lay potential to combat environmental and biological determinism and innatism, however, and **this should not be forgotten in a rush to condemn humanism’s universalism** as well as its anthropocentrism. It is in the tensions within universalism that the ongoing potential of an always provisional, **self-conscious, flexible and strategic humanism** – one that now recognises the continuity between the human and the non-human as well as the power-laden particularities of the male, middle class, Western human subject – resides.

### AT: Patel

#### Debate is not an educational model predicated on destroyers----Tactical affirmation of the state and refusing Settlerism can go together.

Svirsky 14 Marcelo Svirsky, On the study of collaborative struggles in settler societies, Pages 434-449 | Published online: 29 Jul 2014, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/2201473X.2014.911648?src=recsys

Patrick Wolfe claims that binarism is our shared historical positionality in settler societies. As I have stated in the introduction to this special issue, the history and political relevance of empirical binarism are indisputable.11. Patrick Wolfe, ‘Introduction: Recuperating Binarism – A Heretical Introduction’, Settler Colonial Studies 3, nos. 3–4 (2013): 257–9. See also Patrick Wolfe, ‘Nation and Miscegenation: Discursive Continuity in the Post-Mabo Era’, Social Analysis 36 (1994): 93–152 and ‘Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native’, Journal of Genocide Research 8, no. 4 (2006): 387–409. View all notes To refute binarism is in more ways than one to deny that a predatory settler structure has been forced on Native peoples. Therefore, as Wolfe insists, the repudiation of binarism may well be complicit with the settler logic of elimination, regardless of whether that repudiation comes from a critique of settlerism.22. Wolfe, ‘Introduction’, 259–60. View all notes Only that binarism in settler societies is not necessarily a tree that one either must idolise or bark at. A narrow array of assumptions originates this false choice. As Wolfe proves by way of his own anti-settlerism, the recognition of empirical binarism does not necessarily align our position with the Euro-racial attitudes of the doctrine of discovery. On the other hand, as I show in this paper, a critical attitude towards the binary principle does not necessarily reflect a conspiratory desire to assimilate the Native as a way to complete the settlerist project. The question is whether or not, by dethroning the principle from its conceptual and affective primacy, the logics of elimination remains uninterrupted. In other words, binarism invites for positions. By ‘binarising’ binarism and its repudiation in one dialectical stroke, Wolfe takes his moral attitude towards settler colonialism into safe grounds, as if saying – I cannot be fingered as doubting settler maliciousness (or in Wolfe's own words, ‘I have regularly been accused of binarism – though not once by a Native’).33. Ibid., 257. View all notes The virtue of Wolfe's argument is that it offers a way of escaping from the coercion to choose between binarism and its repudiation: ‘In addition to characterising the past and the present, however, does our recognition of the structural continuity of settler colonialism predetermine the future?’ he notes.44. Ibid., 274. View all notes My answer to this question is that binarism's structural continuity does not preclude the future, and more specifically, it does not prevent the emergence of non-settlerist collective forms, however fragile these forms were or are. I define these forms of collectivity as ‘collaborative alliances’, and the struggles led by them as ‘collaborative struggles’. Transcending settlerism is about taking its vital organs – its logics, laws, institutions, and everyday practices – and the relationships between them back into the workshop of history, to remake the body of society.5 5. As Deleuze and Guattari would have it, this is about making the settlerist body, one without organs. View all notes Defining them as struggles highlights their minoritarian position in society, as forms that either never reached in the past the necessary maturity and intensity to face the expanding predation of settler machines, or as forms that strive in the present with great difficulty to offer alternative modes of being in specific social spheres. There is something empirically erroneous in Wolfe's rhetorical question I quoted above. Though it makes room to imagine alternatives in the future, the past and present are given as if nothing new can be said about them. As a history yet to be coherently written, the case of Zionist settlerism is very telling. Researchers have reported of collaborative alliances, of shared life between Palestinian and Jews forged in Ottoman times,66. Michelle Campos, Ottoman Brothers (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011). View all notes and, importantly, sustained even during the very days of the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians in 1948.88. See Ariella Azoulay, ‘Civil Alliances – Palestine, 47–48’, Settler Colonial Studies 4, no. 4 (2014), doi:10.1080/2201473X.2014.911657, and Ariella Azoulay, ‘Potential History: Thinking Through Violence’, Critical Inquiry 39, no. 3 (2013): 548–74. View all notes Henry Reynolds offers such a reading of Australian settlerism in this special issue. Acknowledging the empirical coexistence of binarism and collaborative alliances is not a misrecognition of the former,99. as long as the idea of collaborative alliances does not become synonymous with hybridity,1010 or is articulated in ways that blur the fleshy accuracy of settlerist asymmetries. Because it carries a conceptual and affective abuse of history, it is the political misuse of empirical binarism which needs to be challenged. The indisputability of negative binarism as a persistent structural production of settler societies explains the landscapes of our collective memory and it shapes the horizons of our political dispositions, but it does not compel the hermetic obturation of war machines striving to substitute settlerism. To welcome such a view is tantamount to give up on political imagination.

#### Specifically, the disappearance of antitrust law from public discourse has cemented corporate power. A paradigm shift is possible, but requires making monopolies a political issue again, and advocating legal change.

David Dayen 15, author of *Monopolized: Life in the Age of Corporate Power (2020)* and *Chain of Title: How Three Ordinary Americans Uncovered Wall Street's Great Foreclosure Fraud*, “Bring Back Antitrust,” The American Prospect, Vol. 26, No. 4, Fall 2015, lexis.

In 1964, historian Richard Hofstadter gave a speech at the University of California, Berkeley, titled "What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?" He wondered why anti-monopoly sentiment ceased to become the subject of public agitation. "Once the United States had an antitrust movement without antitrust prosecutions," Hofstadter said. "In our time, there have been antitrust prosecutions without an antitrust movement."

Now we have lost both the movement and the prosecutions. When we talk about banks that are too big to fail, we're talking about antitrust. When we talk about the high cost of health care, we're talking about antitrust. So many of our key domestic issues are fundamentally questions about whether we should tolerate monopolies, or dismantle them. But this formulation-a centerpiece of public debate in the last robberbaron era between the 1880s and 1910s-has all but disappeared from popular discourse.

Can anti-monopoly sentiment be revived? When New York's Working Families Party first recruited Zephyr Teachout to run for governor, she said she would only do it if she could talk about monopolies. "They polled it, and they were correct that nobody knew what I was talking about," Teachout says. But when she eventually ran an insurgent campaign against incumbent Andrew Cuomo, she was determined to talk about it anyway.

"The minute you got past the sound-bite level, people responded to the concentration of power," Teachout says. They did campaign events at places where people paid their cable bills, using the pending Comcast-Time Warner merger, eventually abandoned, as the hook. She engaged farmers in upstate New York about monopsony power, and discussed Amazon and big banks on the stump. And it resonated. After only one month of campaigning, Teachout won 35 percent of the vote, with particular strength in upstate counties where farming issues were prominent.

"The Tea Party talks to people and says, 'You're out of power because government is taking it away from you,"' Teachout says. "Far too often, Democrats say, 'You're wrong, you're not out of power.' That's dissonant with our lived experience. You're out of power ... because your priorities don't matter and JPMorgan's do."

Beyond Teachout, you can see through the haze the stirrings of a grassroots antitrust agenda. The greatest anti-monopoly victory of the modern age, the Federal Communications Commission's net-neutrality rules, owed much to a smart, tech-savvy movement that leveraged big protest platforms. Web-native activists fought for the decentralized power of the Internet, without gatekeepers collecting tolls along the way. And they made the connection to things like the Comcast-Time Warner merger, which failed amid public outcry.

"After this existential threat to the Web, you see the same groups becoming interested in the deep history of anti-monopoly laws," Teachout says. "It's kind of an exciting intellectual moment, a fusion between old-school farmers who have been complaining for 30 years and new net-neutrality dreamers."

Monopolists have long used technological advances to consolidate power, from Gilded Age tycoons leveraging control of railroads and telegraphs to Amazon using its first-mover status in e-commerce to squeeze book producers, or Google harvesting traffic to their market-leading search engine to serve ads. It's easy to translate the need for a neutral platform for websites into the same need for book sales or car ride-sharing.

The European Union, in fact, did file formal antitrust charges against Google, accusing it of forcing search engine users into its own shopping platforms, and bundling Android phones with their own apps, to prevent competitors from performing the same functions. The FTC shut down its own investigation into Google over the same concerns in 2013. But an inadvertent disclosure revealed that the agency's Bureau of Competition recommended bringing a lawsuit, arguing that Google's conduct "has resulted-and will result-in real harm to consumers and to innovation in the online search and advertising markets." The political leadership ignored the recommendation.

The next administration must show "leadership that has a certain intellectual curiosity," says Maurice Stucke, pointing to the Google case as a missed opportunity. An alteration in posture would make enforcement far more vigorous, and bringing more cases will give litigators more experience and confidence to negotiate the judicial barriers. The American Antitrust Institute plans to create a transition document for the incoming administration, as they did for the Obama transition.

But at a time of political disempowerment, teaching about the dangers of monopolies and how we have the laws on the books to fight them, and creating upward pressure to do it, offers great potential for a paradigm shift. Connecting Senator Elizabeth Warren's fight against a rigged financial system and Al Franken's fight against media concentration can spark broader political energy.

You could see this potential in Washington, D.C., where in August, the city's Public Service Commission rejected a merger between energy firms Exelon and Pepco, citing "more active participation by parties and interested persons than any other proceeding in the Commission's more than a century of operations." Activists argued a giant Exelon conglomerate would fail to devote resources to the city's clean-energy goals, connecting anti-monopolization with fighting climate change.

There are a lot of reasons for runaway monopolies: an intellectual hijacking by Chicago-school conservative economists, the over-financialization of the economy, a failure of federal antitrust enforcement. But perhaps the biggest reason is that antitrust policy has become divorced from politics, confined to specialized lawyers and mathematicians instead of citizens and activists. Without grassroots momentum, politicians and enforcement agencies can safely ignore the issue. That's the challenge for a small band of academics, think-tank fellows, and activists: to make monopolies a vital issue again, connecting with the severe economic anxiety Americans feel.

#### Working within legal and political structures is especially key to solve their impacts.

**Rifkin 17,** Mark Rifkin is Director of the Women's and Gender Studies Program and Professor of English at the University of North Carolina, Greensboro and the author of several books, including Settler Common Sense: Queerness and Everyday Colonialism in the American Renaissance. ["Indigenizing Agamben: Rethinking Sovereignty in Light of the “Peculiar” Status of Native Peoples," Sovereign Acts: Contesting Colonialism Across Indigenous Nations and Latinx America, University of Arizona Press, 2017, pgs. 296-335.]//ARK1

As against Alfred’s call for eschewing the framework of “sovereignty,” Dale Turner insists that the **protection of Native peoples involves** making their **concerns** and **representations intelligible within** the **legal and political structures of the settler state**. In This Is Not a Peace Pipe, Turner argues that the **political terrain on which Native** peoples **must move** has been **mapped by the settler state** and that **if they are to gain greater traction** for their land claims and assertions of governmental autonomy, they will need to **express them** in ways **that non-Native** people and **institutions can understand**: “As a matter of survival, **Aboriginal intellectuals must engage** the **non-Aboriginal intellectual landscapes from which** their **political rights and sovereignty** are **articulated** and put to use in Aboriginal communities.”66 Given that non-Native political processes already are active in shaping the terms of Indigenous governance and social life, **Native** peoples cannot **afford simply to ignore them or** to insist on the significance of “traditional” knowledge in ways that **speak past non-Native modes of articulation**. Turner suggests that such translation is the work of “the word warrior,” whose “most difficult task will be to **reconcile indigenous ways of knowing with** the **forms of knowledge that define European intellectual traditions**.”67 “Survival” for Native polities, from this perspective, is predicated on a kind of communication in which discrepant “ways of knowing” can be bridged. However, to what extent does Turner’s notion of “**reconcil[ing]” knowledges** also present the struggle over sovereignty as a function of cultural dissonance **between Indigenous peoples and the settler state**? The central question he poses is, “How do we explain our differences and in the process **empower ourselves to actually change** the **state’s legal and political practices**?”68 But does **transposing Indigenous concepts into non-Native terminologies intervene** in the logic structuring “the state’s legal and political practices”? Does such a conversion challenge the jurisdictional imperative and imaginary driving the settler-state assertion of authority over Native peoples?

The idea of “explain[ing]” Indigenous “differences” acknowledges the imperial force exerted under the sign of sovereignty, but it does not contest the state’s monopoly over the legitimate exercise of legitimacy, nor does it prevent those “differences” from being reified, regulated, and subordinated as “culture” in the ways discussed earlier. Alongside the discussion of the necessity for translation by “word warriors,” Turner also calls for a thorough accounting of the violences of settler-state imperialism: “The project of unpacking and laying bare the meaning and effects of colonialism will open up the physical and **intellectual space for Aboriginal voice to participate** in the **legal** and **political practices of the state**.”69 Later, he suggests that **Indigenous intellectuals should** pursue three goals: “(a) they must take up, **deconstruct**, and continue to **resist colonialism** and its effects on indigenous peoples; (b) they must protect and defend indigeneity; **and** (c) they must **engage the legal and political discourses of the state** in an effective way.”70 What kind of “participat[ion]” and “engage[ment]” do such strategies yield?

Although Turner tends to answer this question by focusing on the possibility of explaining Indigenous intellectual traditions, making them comprehensible to non-Natives, the above comments offer another option, namely, deconstructing the dynamics of settler-state power—problematizing the ways it seeks to generate legitimacy for itself. He describes such intervention as “understanding . . . how colonialism has been woven into the normative political language that guides contemporary Canadian legal and political practices,” and folding deconstruction back into the elaboration of “differences” between Natives and non-Natives, he argues, “**indigenous peoples must use** the **normative language of the dominant culture to** ultimately **defend world views** that are **embedded in completely different normative frameworks**.

### AT: Decolonization Alt

#### You should not endorse a politics of decolonization. Settler colonialism’s structural account shuts down ways to imagine liberatory futures.

Rachel BUSBRIDGE 17, Alexander von Humboldt Postdoctoral Fellow in Institut für Islamwissenschaft (Institute of Islamic Studies), Freie Universität Berlin [“Israel-Palestine and the Settler Colonial ‘Turn’: From Interpretation to Decolonization,” *Theory, Culture & Society*, First Published: January 23, 2017, p. 1-25, Emory Libraries]

The prescription for decolonization – that is, a normative project committed to the liberation of the colonized and the overturning of colonial relationships of power (Kohn and McBride, 2011: 3) – is indeed one of the most counter-hegemonic implications of the settler colonial paradigm as applied to Israel-Palestine, potentially shifting it from a diagnostic frame to a prognostic one which offers a ‘proposed solution to the problem, or at least a plan of attack’ (Benford and Snow, 2000: 616). What, however, does the settler colonial paradigm offer by way of envisioning decolonization? As Veracini (2007) notes, while settler colonial studies scholars have sought to address the lack of attention paid to the experiences of indigenous peoples in conventional historiographical accounts of decolonization (which have mostly focused on settler independence and the loosening of ties to the ‘motherland’), there is nevertheless a ‘narrative deficit’ when it comes to imagining settler decolonization. While Veracini (2007) relates this deficit to a matter of conceptualization, it is apparent that the structural perspective of the paradigm in many ways closes down possibilities of imagining the type of social and political transformation to which the notion of decolonization aspires. In this regard, there is a worrying tendency (if not tautological discrepancy) in settler colonial studies, where the only solution to settler colonialism is decolonization – which a faithful adherence to the paradigm renders largely unachievable, if not impossible.

To understand why this is the case, it is necessary to return to Wolfe’s (2013a: 257) account of settler colonialism as guided by a ‘zero-sum logic whereby settler societies, for all their internal complexities, uniformly require the elimination of Native alternatives’. The structuralism of this account has immense power as a means of mapping forms of injustice and indignity as well as strategies of resistance and refusal, and Wolfe is careful to show how transmutations of the logic of elimination are complex, variable, discontinuous and uneven. Yet, in seeking to elucidate the logic of elimination as the overarching historical force guiding settler-native relations there is an operational weakness in the theory, whereby such a logic is simply there, omnipresent and manifest even when (and perhaps especially when) it appears not to be; the settler colonial studies scholar need only read it into a situation or context. It thus hurtles from the past to the present into the future, never to be fully extinguished until the native is, or until history itself ends. There is thus a powerful ontological (if not metaphysical) dimension to Wolfe’s account, where there is such thing as a ‘settler will’ that inherently desires the elimination of the native and the distinction between the settler and the native can only ever be categorical, founded as it is on the ‘primal binarism of the frontier’ (2013a: 258). It is here that the differences between earlier settler colonial scholarship on Israel-Palestine and the recent settler colonial turn come into clearest view. While Jamal Hilal’s (1976) Marxist account of the conflict, for instance, engaged Palestinians and Jewish Israelis in terms of their relations to the means of production, Wolfe’s account brings its own ontology: the bourgeoisie/proletariat distinction becomes that of settler/native, and the class struggle the struggle between settler, who seeks to destroy and replace the native, and native, who can only ever push back. Indeed, if the settler colonial paradigm views history in similar teleological terms to the Marxist framework, it does not offer the same hopeful vision of a liberated future. After all, settler colonialism has only one story to tell – ‘either total victory or total failure’ (Veracini, 2007).

Veracini’s attempt to disaggregate different forms of settler decolonization is revealing of the difficulties that come along with this zero-sum perspective. It is significant to note that beyond settler evacuation (which may decolonize territory, he cautions, but not necessarily relationships) the picture he paints is a relatively bleak one. For Veracini (2011: 5), claims for decolonization from indigenous peoples in settler societies can take two broad forms: an ‘anti-colonial rhetoric expressing a demand for indigenous sovereign independence and self-determination … and an “ultra”-colonial one that seeks a reconstituted partnership with the [settler state] and advocates a return to a relatively more respectful middle ground and “treaty” conditions’. While both, he suggests, are tempting strategies in the struggle for change, though ‘ultimately ineffective against settler colonial structures of domination’ (2011: 5), it is the latter strategy that invites Veracini’s most scathing assessment. As he writes,

under settler colonial conditions the independent polity is the settler polity and sanctioning the equal rights of indigenous peoples has historically been used as a powerful weapon in the denial of indigenous entitlement and in the enactment of various forms of coercive assimilation. This decolonisation actually enhances the subjection of indigenous peoples … it is at best irrelevant and at worst detrimental to indigenous peoples in settler societies. (2011: 6–7)

#### Even if the decolonization happens, it’ll empower white reactionaries who coopt and undermine any revolution----turns case.

Culp & Bond-Graham ‘14 (Visiting Assistant Professor of Rhetoric Studies at Whitman College; a sociologist and investigative journalist, ANDREW CULP and DARWIN BOND-GRAHAM, Left Gun Nuts, http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/05/29/left-gun-nuts/)

The more radical variant of this argument is that “the people” need guns to wage an eventual revolution and liberate themselves from the shackles of the state and corporate America. Gun control need not dampen the spirit of those still hoping for a revolution, even if such a revolution is highly unlikely to happen in our lifetimes. What stands in the way of such leftist dreams are the vast majority of current gun owners. Over-represented among current gun owners are white reactionary men, the types who regularly expresses their desire to shoot on sight the “Muslim socialist” president of the United States, and who “muster” along the U.S.-Mexico boarder with their weaponry to defend the nation against “alien” immigrants. As it stands, toxic gun culture would coopt any new American revolution with a lethal cocktail of supercharged masculinity, racism, and provincialism fantasized about in post-apocalyptic scenes. If the United States ever comes to another civil war, the first thing to die under a barrage of lead will be our hope for a more just and democratic society; guns would empower warlords with petty political agendas, not egalitarian-minded freedom fighters. The most likely cultural shift away from reactionary gun ownership will not happen in cooperation with the Right and their politics, but against it. Gun control is the best place to start. Disarming the Right will do more to advance goals toward a revolutionary democratic transformation of America than trying to beat the Right-wingers (and the U.S. government!) in an arms race. Of course Left insurrectionists who advocate the right to bear arms are more focused on the U.S. Government as the singular impediment to their variant of utopia. This dream is sadly a classic example of radical posturing done in the name of some distant hypothetical moment, and it ignores the actual harm that guns cause each and every day. In the real world, guns kill upwards of 30,000 Americans every year, virtually all of these deaths serving absolutely no political purpose in the fight for a more democratic society. Most of these deaths are just tragic accidents or suicides, many of which would not end in death if guns were not in the mix. Left fantasies about armed struggle are the same half-baked ideas as those held by the secessionist Right. What varies for Leftists is the template of decolonial struggles; yet a leftist revolution in the United States would not kick out a small minority of foreign occupiers, as happened in India and Vietnam, but would be a fight amongst settler colonialists for political authoristy. This is why the worn “Zapatistas defense” touted by the radical left is a bad analogy for the United States context – the Zapatistas started a peasant rebellion that kicked outsiders off their landbase, a task for which wooden cutouts of guns turned out to be more effective than the real thing.

#### Their settler colonialism thesis is totalizing.

Greenstein 16, associate professor of sociology at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 6/6 (Ran, “Settler Colonialism: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis?” http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/24603/settler-colonialism\_a-useful-category-of-historica)

What is the problem with settler colonialism as a historical concept? In a sense, its strongest point is also its weakest: it is applicable to many cases that exhibit a great diversity of conditions. It has been applied to countries that saw settlers overwhelm the indigenous population to such a degree that it became demographically and economically marginal. For example, indigenous people are no more than three percent of the population in the USA, Canada and Australia. In other countries, such as Kenya, Rhodesia, Algeria, Mozambique and South Africa, indigenous people remained the bulk of the population, as well as the main source of labor. Slavery featured prominently in some cases (USA, early colonial South Africa) but not in others. Settlers of European origins retained strong legal and political links to the mother country in Algeria, Kenya, Rhodesia, and Portuguese African colonies. They became independent in the USA, South Africa and other British offshoots, at times as a result of a violent intra-colonial conflict. In some places most settlers left the territory after independence from colonial rule – as in Algeria, Mozambique, Angola, and Rhodesia. Large numbers stayed put in other countries, such as Namibia and South Africa. And, of course, where they became numerically dominant, settlers used their political independence to consolidate their rule, marginalizing “natives” further. But they also incorporated them into the new polity when the demographic ratio was sufficiently favorable so as not to pose a threat to settler domination. This contrasts with the maintenance of legal-racial divisions in places where indigenous people remained a majority of the population. Indigenous strategies have differed as well. They have consisted of attempts to integrate as individuals on an equal basis in some countries. In others, indigenous people sought to maintain pre-colonial identities and modes of organization. Still others have formed nationalist movements on the new ground created by colonial settlement, or focused on race as a basis for resistance. Most of these strategies acknowledge, to varying degrees, settlers as legitimate members of the envisaged future liberated society. It is not only the broad contours of history that vary greatly in settler colonial societies but also patterns of social change over time. Constant geographical expansion while driving out indigenous people has occurred in the USA and Australia. Elsewhere there has been constant expansion while incorporating indigenous people as labor power, in South Africa most notably. In other cases there has been an initial takeover of the entire territory with more-or-less fixed relations of subordination throughout the period – for example in Algeria, Kenya, Rhodesia, and Namibia. There have been different degrees of incorporation of “urban natives” in a relatively privileged position compared to rural populations, and different combinations of direct and indirect despotism, to use Mahmood Mamdani’s notions of colonial rule in late colonial Africa. In other words, the category of settler colonialism is compatible with different demographic ratios and different trajectories of indigenous-settler relations. It can go along with different relations between settlers and metropolitan centers and different destinies of settlers in the post-colonial period. It is compatible with different social structures, relying variously on free white labor, and indentured immigrant labor, from Europe, India or other places. Or it can rely on African slavery, indigenous labor subordination, and combinations of the above. In all these respects, settler colonial societies do not share a single historical dynamic nor do they exhibit a tendency to move in similar directions. They may end up with the consolidation of settler rule or its demise through indigenous resistance and victory. None of the possible outcomes serves to mark the historical trajectory of settler colonialism apart from other types of colonial societies. In the absence of a unique trajectory, does settler colonialism display perhaps specific conceptual features? That is to say, does it work as a theoretical model? A model offers a relationship between a limited number of concepts or variables. It aims to make sense of large number of observations. It reduces the infinite variety of empirical reality into discrete units with distinct dynamics or laws of motion. Do models of colonial societies (settler, exploitation, plantation, and so on), show us how some cases differ from others in theoretical terms? Do they outline distinct ways in which concepts such as class, race, ethnicity, identity, state, gender, power, sexuality, ideology, space, time, and discourse, manifest themselves concretely or intersect with one another? If we pose the question in this way, the conclusion seems unavoidable. Settler colonialism as a category of historical analysis does not establish any specific social-theoretical dynamics unique to it. We cannot use its historical features to distinguish it analytically – not just descriptively – from other types of societies, be they colonial or not.

# 1NR Round 2

#### 1. Cap enables land dispossession and subsequent racial ideologies – terra nullis was only desirable because of expansion of agriculture and plunder of resources.

Symanski 85 – Professor of sociology at the University of Oregon [Al, “The Structure of Race,” *Review of Radical Political Economies* 17(4): 106-20, Emory Libraries]

RELATIONSHIPS OF EXCLUSION

As capitalism expanded through imperialism to subordinate virtually all corners of the globe, it came into contact with native peoples such as the American Indians and Australian Aborigines who for the most part could not (outside the Mexican and Peruvian regions) generally be made to work profitably (Harris 1964; Geschwender 1978:l20-25). Such peoples then became mere obstacles to the profitable exploitation of the natural resources and land of the areas they inhabited. Successful development of agriculture in Argentina, Australia, Brazil or North America thus implied the elimination of the indigenous inhabitants through either physical extermination or forcible relocation to remote and barren areas. Imperialism and capitalism’s relationship to such indigenous and “superflouous” populations can best be referred to as one of exclusion - exclusion from the land, as well as from the class structure. Such populations then become “redundant” in relation to the needs of capital.

A distinctive form of racialist ideology developed to justify the physical extermination and forcible relocation of such peoples and the consequent appropriation of their land and resources by expanding imperialism. This racialist ideology legitimated genocide in terms of indigenous peoples not being fully human, and relocation in terms of their inherent inability to productively and creatively utilize resources. American Indians have suffered great oppression, not because their labor was exploited, but because their resources were required by expanding capitalism (Gossett 1963: Chap. 10).

#### 6. This shift to late modern capitalism and its attendant socio-political instability has rendered the coloniality framework of the 1ac fundamentally bankrupt.

Chibber 13 – Professor of sociology at NYU [Vivek, *Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital*, p. 293-296]

My argument amounts to the contention that postcolonial theory impedes the development of an adequate analysis of the modern epoch, whether in the East or the West. Is there any chance it will be displaced from its exalted status in the near future? Interestingly, if ever there was a time when the sheer force of events should suffice to undermine a theory, it is now. Two facts about the current conjuncture would seem to deliver a decisive and devastating blow to the postcolonial studies framework, while affirming the arguments I have leveled against it. The first of these is the global economic crisis that began in 2007-8, and the second is the series of revolts in the Middle East known as the Arab Spring.

The global economic crisis has brought into relief the basic fact that the entire world is now part of the same universal history, subject to the same underlying forces. There is no more dramatic illustration of capitals universalization than the fact that the entire world has been engulfed by its effects. This is not the first time this has happened, of course. Crises in the history of capitalism have always been global in their impact. But it is the first time such a cataclysm has hit since post­colonial theory arrived on the scene. For the first time since the 1980s, everyone is talking about capitalism – not alterity, or hybridity, or the fragment, but the ubiquitous, grinding, crushing force of capital. This certainly makes for a friendlier environment for the arguments I have been developing in this book, and which others will no doubt make in the years to come.

Even more devastating than the economic collapse, however, is the Arab Spring. It is hard to imagine a more dramatic confirmation of the two universalisms than the demands that came from the streets of Tunisia, Egypt, or the other centers of revolt. These were demands for bread, rights, jobs, and democracy. In fact, without exception, commentators were taken aback by the centrality of secular, universalistic, and materialist demands in the movements. This is not the first time such demands have been seen in the Middle East; secular nationalism was the main political ideology of the region in the middle decades of the twentieth century. But since the 1970s, it was Islamists of varying stripes that had gained traction within civil society. The growth of religious political organizations, and the steady enervation of secular Left forces, had been one of the conditions that lent credibility to the new Orientalism espoused by postcolonial theory. Yet when the Springs mass movements exploded onto the scene, the Islamists were largely marginal to them. Their banners were hard to find.5 What the masses of young revolutionaries called for was liberty, justice, and dignity – demands one should expect, if postcolonial theory is to be believed, only in the streets of Paris or New York. And if that were not enough, when the United States and Europe experienced a series of mass mobilizations against austerity during the months after the Arab Spring, the youth in the streets of Barcelona, New York, and Athens carried signs saluting their counterparts in Cairo and Tunis, citing them as inspirations. How could this be? How could calls for jobs and rights in the West take inspiration from the Orient, if the latter are not even supposed to be motivated by such matters?

Hence, one can make the argument that the past five years have created optimal conditions for the recognition of postcolonial theory’s shortcomings. But will it be displaced? In fact, I doubt we will witness its eclipse anytime in the near future. Postcolonial theory came to prominence during a period of massive political defeats for the Left, all across the world.6 Indeed, I rather doubt there has ever been a time since the birth of the modern Left that its forces were as enfeebled as they have been since the 1980s. It is now a commonplace that the turn to irrationalism within the self-styled “radical” intelligentsia was very closely tied to their retreat into the academy.7 But it was not just that this brought about a change in intellectual culture, narrowly conceived. Over the past quarter century, enormous resources have been sunk into the material infrastructure that sustains the theory. There are journals wholly committed to it, chairs in humanities departments dedicated to its propagation, sections in disciplinary societies that convene annually with hundreds of attendees, book series at publishing houses with enormous lists and promises of forthcoming volumes. None of this will come to an end anytime soon simply because the theory happens to be deeply flawed.

And this brings up the second obstacle. By now, not only have lavish material resources been plowed into the field, but hundreds of scholars have built their reputations on it. This institutional network is staffed by academics whose professional life now orbits around the ideas propagated by the theory. Apart from the first generation of postcolonial theorists, the second generation, their students, constitutes a bulwark against the possibility of critique – and hence the possibility of one’s own reputation becoming sullied. For scholars from the Global South, who have now for decades promoted the Orientalism central to postcolonial theory, the prospect of exposure is especially devastating. There are now legions of intellectuals who have staked their reputations on this theoretical framework, who have made their careers on extolling its virtues and its deep insights. Put these factors together, and one should expect that the response to the political developments of the past couple of years will be twofold: to bend and twist the theory so that it might appear capable of accommodating developments that rather directly undermine its basic propositions; and to violently attack any concerted critique issuing from the outside.

For those familiar with the literature on the history of science, my prognosis ought not to come as a surprise. Decades ago, Thomas Kuhn described the process of theoretical development in the history of scientific thought.8 He showed that when scientific theories meet with empirical anomalies or even outright disconfirmation, they are not easily displaced by their rivals. They are able to survive for long periods, in large part because of the resources that can be deployed to defend them, and because the reputations of so many scientists hang on the success of the flawed theories. What I have described in the case of postcolonial theory is much the same phenomenon, except that it is occurring in the moral sciences. If anything, the absence of experimental conditions, along with the more dubious intellectual culture of the social sciences and humanities, makes the likelihood of rapid displacement even more remote.

None of this is to suggest, however, that the situation is hopeless. Quite the contrary. The times in which we live do offer a tremendous opportunity to expose the flaws of the theory and even to displace it. My point is simply that if this is going to happen, it will not happen on its own. It will take some time and a great deal of effort. All the more reason to begin now.

#### 3. Socialism isn’t white-male politics---that’s a myth perpetuated by the ruling classes who fear its unifying potential.

Kshama SAWANT 17, Seattle city councilwoman and member of Socialist Alternative, interview with Daniel Moattar [“The Society We Are Fighting for Has to Be Free From All Oppression,” *Jacobin*, August 22 17, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/08/kshama-sawant-interview-seattle-city-council]

*There’s a powerful idea of a resurgent left right now. But there’s also a pervasive media narrative that leftism, and especially socialism, are by and for white men – at least in the United States. Where do you think that perception comes from? Does your experience bear it out?*

I think there is no doubt that the perception socialism is a white idea – it’s not a consequence of actual observations of people of color.

In my view, to a large degree, it’s a manufactured concept. It suits the ruling class to find different ways of discrediting the ideas of socialism precisely because those ideas are extremely attractive to a large mass of people, many of whom are young workers of color.

The recent Harvard-Harris survey shows that Bernie Sanders is the most popular politician in America. This is not among highly educated middle-class voters. This is among all demographics. His popularity is in the stratosphere. 80 percent of Democrats. 73 percent of registered black voters. 68 percent of registered Hispanic voters.

Is he popular because he’s white? Is he popular despite being white? I don’t think race, in any essential way, enters the equation. What people like about Bernie Sanders is that he is fighting against the establishment. His campaign last year was a real program, a serious program, of social-democratic demands. Single-payer, fifteen dollars an hour, education for all, fighting against the corporate establishment: this is what people are looking for.

It’s a complete myth that socialism is only for white people, but it’s not surprising in any way that the ruling class in America is trying hard to discredit this idea, because, as I said, it’s extremely popular.

It’s one of the signs we have to point to as evidence that we are in a fundamentally new period. This is not the same as even five or seven years ago. Socialism is no longer a dirty word.

When we ran our first campaign for city council in 2012 13, I was told by a lot of political operatives, “If you want to win, don’t go around using the S-word.” People would say, “God, do you really have to start every speech by saying ‘I’m a socialist’?”

But this is not the Cold War era. New generations, entire swathes of young people, have no connection whatever to that vilification of socialism. They are angry about the status quo. They are angry because they know no matter how hard they work, how much education they get, they will never be able to replicate the middle-class living standards of the previous generation.

It’s not because white socialists came and told young people of color, “You should subscribe to the ideas of socialism.” People are drawing their own conclusions. Look at the crushing burden of student debt. You saw the young person who questioned Nancy Pelosi at a town hall. Her response was completely tone deaf.

It shows why the Democratic Party is having such a hard time keeping the faith with young people. The reason they’re in crisis is that they’re out of touch with the reality that the tide is shifting now.

People are looking for a political alternative that will actually fight for them. They’re not looking for some mild rhetoric and some even milder reforms. Socialist Alternative and I, on the left, we were very clear about this last year: of course there’s a difference between Trump and Clinton. That’s not in debate. What is in debate is, what does the Democratic Party establishment offer as an alternative? And how do we fight the right-wing agenda?

#### Class struggle doesn’t supplant indigenous identity or experience---the Green Corn Rebellion and vertical organizing by miners and Navajo labor unions prove the flexible efficacy of movements that attack capitalism as a super structure.

Dunbar-Ortiz 14 (Roxanne, activist, writer, feminist, socialist, history PhD, "A sense of hope and the possibility of solidarity", <http://isreview.org/issue/103/sense-hope-and-possibility-solidarity>)

As we have been diving into current debates and writings from the Left, we have found an absence of analysis on the question of Native Americans and labor. You mentioned Glen Coulthard earlier and he actually says in the introduction of Red Skin, White Masks, It appears that the history of dispossession, not proletarianization, has been the dominant background structure shaping the character of the historical relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Canadian state . . . Stated bluntly, the theory and practice of Indigenous anticolonialism, including Indigenous anticapitalism, is best understood as a struggle primarily inspired by and oriented around the question of land . . . and less around our emergent status as “rightless proletarians.” But in fact, you have talked about many Native Americans being part of the working class as you mention recently in your Real News interview.11 Why is this? For instance, in the Diné Nation (Navajo reservation), the energy industry has long dominated, and in the 1970s, Navajos formed trade unions to demand that they have the jobs and job training. In the early part of the twentieth century, Navajos and Pueblo Indians made up much of the work force on the railroads that ran through their territories in the Southwest. In the federal government’s relocation program of the 1950s and 1960s, half the reservation and rural population migrated to urban areas for jobs in industry; however, many had moved on their own during the war to work in the defense industry. I think ignoring this is a problem for some academics. Some of the Native people in academia come from more prosperous families. I don’t believe any Native person is super wealthy; even in the biggest casinos the money is distributed and there is not a real ruling class—but there are definitely class issues in terms of consciousness. All the AIM activists were from working-class families, but are no less Lakota, Diné, or Salish because of it. They worked at all kinds of jobs. So for me, I felt really comfortable in AIM because it was working class and people were not ashamed to be workers. In fact they were quite proud, and they were drawn to unions when anyone bothered to organize them. When the Navajo workers began to organize in the 1970s with the United Mine Workers, it was against federal law for unions to organize on Indian reservations. Peter McDonald 12 challenged that and won. The Navajo workers had specific demands for medical benefits; they bargained to include their medicine men to be paid. They had the Indian Health Service, but they wanted to pay their medicine people and were able to get this into their contract. They are very strong union people. Unfortunately, there are other problems with the fossil-fuel industry and internal struggles in reservations over ending extraction for environmental reasons. I think Coulthard is trying to say that exploitation and expropriation are different things. But all capitalism starts with expropriation of land from the producers, and not just in the Americas but as the prerequisite for the development of capitalism in Europe. That’s what I describe as the culture of conquest in my book, about the commons being fenced in and that all expropriation started with the land. We’ve been trying to use Marxism as the framework to talk about Indigenous issues. If you merely say Marxism is European, you miss the point of the theory. People forget that Marx actually talked about who was expropriated, how people were actually dispossessed, and how that created the material basis ultimately for colonization, and how the vast majority of settlers and migrants who came to the US ended up in factories as low-wage workers. I worked hard on the first chapter of my book about the precolonial era in the Americas, where there were prosperous and urban civilizations without capitalism, and that is so hopeful. Most radical forms of anarchism now are anticivilization, and they often look to Native people as the inspiration. They use Indigenous peoples, especially Native people in the Americas, pulling out what they want to justify their ideology. They are creating fantasies as evidence and even calling it science. Anarchists, especially the primitivists, view agriculture as the basis of all evil, because they are looking at agribusiness, and they don’t want to know at all that 90 percent of Native people in the Western hemisphere were agriculturalists—they don’t want to know that fact. So they romanticize Native people as “hunter-gatherers.” This viewpoint distorts the reality in the Western hemisphere. The civilizations of central Mexico and the Andes were still developing before the Europeans intervened. The civilizations of the Americas were going in a different direction than Europe or Asia. I think had Marx really been able to study or know what was hardly even knowable at that time, he would have said that capitalism in the Americas was not inevitable. I always say that 500 years ago with the invasion of the Americas, a wrong path was taken for humanity. So let’s say that capitalism is wrong and destructive, not that it was inevitable. For example, with the ancestral Puebloans, it was clearly a choice. They had a large civilization up on Mesa Verde [in present day Colorado]; they had irrigation ditches for miles and were overusing the wood, because everything was built of wood. They were probably becoming less democratic, and they made the choice to migrate to the Rio Grande area of northern New Mexico and break down into smaller villages. They continued to function like city-states, but they were smaller than the one large civilization up at Mesa Verde. And why not say that was a choice and just maybe that the Americas were going in a different direction, rather than interpreting this or the Maya devolvement as “collapse?” This is something to learn from: civilization without capitalism and how can it work. This is tied with the concept of humans being a part of nature; for example, conventional Marxist thinking argues that private property began with the domestication of animals in Africa. However, in America the ancestral peoples did not domesticate animals for food or as beasts of burden. In the civilizations of Central America, parrots and dogs were domesticated but were considered sacred. The Spanish invaders noted that the Aztec dogs did not bark, but they learned to bark from the Spanish war dogs. Can you talk more about the relationship between settler colonialism and capitalism? What do you define as settler colonialism? What is the difference between settler colonialism and outpost colonialism? Yes, it is really important. I am not sure I entirely succeed in the book on this because the tendency of European-based Marxism is to separate the two, and of course in the United States they are like two separate worlds. Because of Lenin, we have a good connection between capitalism and imperialism, and most people assume the connection. But with colonialism, bourgeois history tends to call things colonialism that weren’t colonialism, such as the Roman Empire. Yes, they had colonies, but it wasn’t capitalist-based. It was a different era; so people like to say “people have been colonizing each other forever,” but colonialism is just a different system under capitalism. In settler colonialism, Europeans export people with the promise of land, and private property, so that land itself becomes the chief commodity in the primitive accumulation of capital, and in North America, colonists also enslaved Africans as both market commodities and unpaid and unfree labor. This is a distinct form of colonialism, which obviously proved to be the most effective in building the most powerful capitalist state, the United States. The main form of European colonialism was to exploit resources—precious metals, African bodies, spices—in which Native labor was organized with European overseers and bureaucrats, as well as Native middlemen. This form of colonialism, of course, produced great wealth for the European monarchies and later European states and created the structures of unequal global markets that persist today. I want to make clear that there is not one “settler colonial” or “colonial” experience. Each has to be analyzed on its own terms, depending on many factors, such as which colonial state and which period of time is being considered. The European fetish for gold that developed during the Middle Ages drove nearly all of the early colonial ventures, but rare spices were also worth their weight in gold. And most importantly, the study of any colonial situation requires understanding the level and nature of resistance to these invasions. In making general conclusions regarding the Anglo and Anglo-American colonization of North America, it is essential to keep in mind that each of the hundreds of Native nations had a unique experience of colonialism, always destructive, but varying in details and survivability. It’s inaccurate to speak, for instance, of “the California Indians.” The eighteenth-century Spanish colonization of the coastal region from San Diego to San Francisco was carried out by Franciscan missionaries with the use of the Spanish army in seizing people in the whole region to be incarcerated in the missions, and to work for the missionaries in their commercial pursuits. So these weren’t typical settlers, but it was settler colonialism. On the other hand, the nearly half of California north of San Francisco was not colonized until the United States confiscated the northern part of what had become Mexico, and the rush of settlers arrived as gold seekers with the 1850s gold rush. These were not typical settlers either, combining extraction with genocide. Colonialism in general is disruptive, destructive, damaging, *sometimes* depopulating entire areas, such as the Natchez villagers of the Mississippi Delta, and the Nahuatl-speaking villagers of western Nicaragua and western Honduras who were seized by Spanish slave traders in the sixteenth century, then transported to work in the mines of Peru. European settlers didn’t arrive to those nearly depopulated areas until later. This was similar to the way villagers of West Africa were captured, enslaved, and sold in the Americas, losing their existence as particular nations and peoples. I would say that settler colonialism was an exceptional mode of colonialism. English settler colonialism in the North American colonies took its specific form from the mid-seventeenth-century English conquest of Ireland, in which English forces under Oliver Cromwell drove subsistent Irish farmers off their land and gave land grants to English and Scottish settlers. The developing English capitalism based in the wool industry required surplus labor to work in the factories, as well as large swaths of grazing land for commercial sheep production. The process of fencing the commons and driving English farmers off the land created that surplus labor force, but also a pool of settlers who were promised free land in America. The Protestant Anglos and Scots, who settled Northern Ireland, made up the majority of frontier settlers in the British North American colonies. The Portuguese and the Spanish were specifically seeking gold and silver. Their hoarding of gold and silver actually limited their ability to develop capitalism. They didn’t really have a basis for that in the Iberian Peninsula after they deported all the farmers, craftsmen, architects, and other producers who were Muslims and Jews. Only in the eighteenth century did Spain begin establishing settler-colonies in the southern cone of South America, employing the same genocidal methods of eliminating or driving out the Indigenous peoples, which continued when Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay became independent. However, only the United States developed effective capitalism outside of Britain. By 1840, it was already the largest economic power in the world on the basis of the global cotton trade and textile factories, also providing cotton to the British textile industry. Until recently, economic historians have dated the development of US capitalism to post–Civil War industrialization in the North. Several recent books have convincingly made the case for the cotton kingdom in the Mississippi Valley being the site of the birth of full-blown capitalism prior to the Civil War, based on slave labor and the capital generated by the value of the slaves’ bodies.13 This development included the parallel expulsion of the five large Native agricultural nations from the Southeast during the 1830s and 1840s, generating huge amounts of capital in land sales. Related to this, do you see a difference between Coulthard and your mentor Howard Adams on these questions and how they view Marxism and socialism in relation to Native people? Having read both of them, I would say first that Coulthard identifies with anarchism. But unlike many anarchists, he is not at all allergic to using aspects of Marxist theory, and he criticizes the idea of dismissing Marxist ideas and arguments. Most important, he identifies capitalism as an enemy of Indigenous self-determination. In his extraordinary book Red Skin, White Masks, he writes, “For Indigenous nations to live, capitalism must die. And for capitalism to die, we must actively participate in the construction of Indigenous alternatives to it.” In that respect, Coulthard and Adams are the same. They both argue that capitalism must die for Indigenous peoples to be free. But at the same time, Coulthard does not recognize the proletarian nature of most Native people’s lives for the past several centuries. I understand that his research is grounded in Dené reality. Howard, on the other hand, grounded his research in the Métis world. In his classic work Prison of Grass, he combines autobiography and the history of the Métis; he characterizes the greatest uprising of Indigenous peoples in Canada and maybe all of North America as a workers’ struggle as well as being an anticolonial struggle. This was the revolution, led by Louis Riel, against the exploitation of the Métis workers in the fur trade, as well as the encroachments into Native territories.14 And, of course, in México and in the Andean region, Indigenous labor is the primary exploited labor. In fact, Native individuals were primarily workers in the colonial economic systems that existed in the US and Canada. They are not significantly a part of the 1 percent: they are workers. A person can have an identity as a worker without losing their Indigenous identity. This does not mean I completely agree with Howard Adams. In the mid-1970s when he was a mentor of mine, I learned a great deal from him. Howard aligned with development theory, which was theorized by economists such as Andre Gunder Frank and others who were looking at Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa, and how European colonialism/capitalism underdeveloped these peoples. The United Nations decolonization mission adopted development theory, with formerly colonized nations calling for transfer of technology and wealth from the rich countries, a kind of reparations plan. The entire regime collapsed in 1980, when the United States withdrew its participation. Howard, like Coulthard, saw alternative Indigenous development as a way to undermine capitalism. Howard Adams also linked US and Canadian overseas imperialisms as something not new to the twentieth century, but rooted in their colonization of the peoples of North America. He was a pioneer in making that connection in the early 1970s. Now, for Native scholars, it is taken for granted. But it’s not surprising that both Coulthard and Adams come out of the Indigenous communities in Canada, where they didn’t experience the level of anticommunism that existed in the United States. The Communist Party in Canada early on included many of the First Peoples who organized Communist Party chapters, particularly in Native fishing villages in British Columbia. The Native presence in or near the Marxist Left and trade unions is very different than in the United States. However, I think a great many Native people in the United States very much feel a unity with militant workers’ struggles. I’ve always found in the Native movement when I tell stories about my grandfather, about the history of the IWW and Socialist Party in Oklahoma, and especially about the 1917 Green Corn Rebellion, in which landless Native, Anglo, and African-American tenant farmers rose up against conscription into World War I, calling it a “rich man’s war,” that there is a sense of hope and possibility for solidarity to struggle together in mutual interest.

#### We can start from foundations of Marx without a Eurocentrist lens.

Ragina Johnson and Brian Ward 18. Activist in the International Socialist Organization, and member of the International Socialist Organization and a long-time Indigenous rights activist in Madison, WI, 9/12/18. “SOCIALISM, SOLIDARITY AND THE INDIGENOUS STRUGGLE.” https://socialistworker.org/2018/09/12/socialism-solidarity-and-the-indigenous-struggle

We are socialists who stand in the tradition of being for Native self-determination, fighting against all forms of oppression, for working-class liberation and for the overthrow of capitalism and socialism from below.

As revolutionary socialists, we understand that national oppression, economic exploitation and social oppression are inextricably linked. We are Marxists drawing on a Marxist method of understanding the world. We know that Marx himself didn’t get it all right, but rather provided a method which socialists have built on.

The issues of national oppression, economic exploitation and social oppression must be taken up together in movements from below if we are ever going to achieve a workers’ revolution on this land mass.

Our starting point, as socialists, is that the oppression of Native Americans and their corresponding resistance of over 500 years is shaped by the dispossession of Indigenous lands and resources.

The U.S. was founded as colonial-settler project. It was built on the bodies of enslaved Blacks and the little-known Indigenous slavery, the dispossession of Indigenous lands and genocide, and the exploitation of laborers, men, women, Native, Black and immigrant alike. American capitalism would not have been possible without this land and labor dripping with blood. Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, describes these dynamics of how capitalism came about in An Indigenous Peoples’ History of the United States.

Everything in U.S. history is about the land. Who oversaw and cultivated it, fished its waters, maintained its wildlife; who invaded and stole it; how it became a commodity (“real estate”) broken into pieces, to be bought and sold on the market.

We cannot have a revolution without the social power of the working class, nor without taking up the racist history of the U.S. or fighting movements of the oppressed to win gains and break down divisions.

#### Socialist struggle and indigenous liberation are compatible. Oppression of native people is deeply rooted in the capitalist system.

Jesse McLaren 19. Activist for decent work and health, and co-author of Indigenous Sovereignty and Socialism. “Indigenous socialism: the life and politics of Howard Adams.” https://springmag.ca/indigenous-socialism-the-life-and-politics-of-howard-adams

“We need to liberate ourselves from the courts, ballot boxes, school system, church, and all other agencies that command us to stay in ‘our colonized place.’ This oppression of the native people is so deeply rooted in the capitalist system that it cannot be completely eliminated without eliminating capitalism itself.”

This September 8 Howard Adams would have turned 98. The Métis socialist was a key theorist and activist of the Red Power movement of the 1960s and 70s, who intertwined the politics of Indigenous liberation and working class revolution. Now, at a time of economic and ecological crisis, his ideas could not be more relevant, yet he is hardly known.

Most settlers on Turtle Island are more likely to know European socialists like Marx and Engels, than an Indigenous socialist like Adams. But you can’t understand one without the other: Engels developed his anti-capitalist critique based on inspiration from egalitarian Indigenous societies (specifically the Haudenosaunee), and Adams used Marxism to develop a theory and practice of Indigenous liberation.

#### 2. The alternative provides the organizational capacity needed for liberator struggles to succeed.

David Bedford ’94. Department of Political Science University of New Brunswick. “MARXISM AND THE ABORIGINAL QUESTION: THE TRAGEDY OF PROGRESS.” http://www3.brandonu.ca/cjns/14.1/bedford.pdf

Socialism offers at least the possibility of preventing the complete destruction of Aboriginal culture. The appetite of the capitalist market and drive for profit is insatiable. A capitalist economy cannot rest content with exploiting only a fixed amount of land, resources and people. It must grow and expand to prevent stagnation and collapse. James Bay I gives way to James Bay II until all of Turtle Island is subdued. There is no need for a socialist society to act differently. It, too, can stop at nothing until all of nature has been transformed into a reflection of its will. A planned economy geared to satisfying need and not to profit at least holds out the possibility of respecting Aboriginal culture and stopping the process of transforming nature. Writing of the abolition of national oppression, Lenin argued that by “transforming capitalism into socialism the proletariat creates the possibility of abolishing national oppression; the possibility becomes reality “only”— “only”!—with the establishment of full democracy in all spheres” (Lenin, 1971:116-117). Democracy is no guarantee of sympathy for Aboriginal peoples by the masses. In the absence of such feeling there is no hope. However, as things stand presently there is little even a sympathetic population can achieve. Furthermore, the drive for profit pits the immigrant society against Aboriginal peoples. All those, and they are currently the majority, who accept the idea of production for profit—including not only the owners but the workers in the pulp industry, the commercial fisheries etc.—must needs see Aboriginal people as an obstacle.

The left, therefore, can offer the Aboriginal liberation struggle the power of labour. Aboriginal people in North America are in a uniquely weak position. Their labour is not needed, and so they have no real weapon with which to fight. Aboriginal people tried using guns at Kahnawake and Kanesatake, but they were quickly overwhelmed although no other Aborig- inal nation was as well positioned to fight as the Mohawks. In short, the Aboriginal struggle for survival cannot succeed without allies, and the only possible ally is organized labour. Presently, labour is the enemy of Aborig- inal peoples because its leadership is tied to reformist policies. Labour sees its own advantage furthered by a flourishing capitalist economy. They are as opposed to Aboriginal treaty rights as the bourgeoisie—witness the confrontations between the Haida and loggers. With a more radical agenda, though, labour can provide the strength Aboriginals lack in their struggle to preserve their culture.